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The Hague International Child
Abduction Convention and The
International Child Abduction Remedies
Act: Closing Doors to the Parent
Abductor
I. INTRODUCTION
International child abductions committed by parents' involved in
a marital breakup have become a worldwide problem. 2 Although
children are abducted both to and from any given country, the
American public generally has focused on the abduction of American
children to foreign countries. 3 Of course, parents of any nationality
1. The term "parent" is a generic term used throughout this comment to refer to the
person or agency exercising custody over the child. For example, a grandparent, foster parent
or child welfare agency, rather than the natural parent, may be a party to the custody dispute.
2. Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International Child Abduction, 14
F m. L.Q. 99, 100 (1980) [hereinafter Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction]. Just as
the number of marriages between people of different nationalities has increased, so has the
number of divorces. Frequently, when such a marriage ends, one parent may take the child
back to that parent's home country. Id.
3. See International Child Abduction Act: Hearing on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971 Before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on
the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1988) [hereinafter Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988] (testimony
of Holly Planells, President, American Children Held Hostage). Ms. Planells, a U.S. citizen
whose child was abducted by the father and removed to Jordan, spoke in support of the
implementing legislation. Jordan is not a party to the Hague Convention.
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experience the same trauma from a child abduction. In the words of
David W. Lloyd, General Counsel of the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, "[W]hether [children] are citizens or foreign
nationals wrongfully brought to and retained here or whether they
are American citizens wrongfully taken to and retained in another
nation, they are all our children." ' 4 At first glance, one may conclude
that this view is more easily adopted philosophically than in a real
life situation. The notion of the world, rather than an individual
country, as "home" to children seemingly runs contrary to a nation's
paternalistic notions of the family and childrearing, as well as an
inclination to protect and provide for its children, both physically
and culturally. Upon reflection, however, one might conclude that
a multinational solution to various national, paternalistic claims is
necessary to ensure the welfare of the child. Paternalism is a necessary
element of parenting; thus, parenting the "world's children" requires
a holistic, world-encompassing approach.
In this light, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
ICARA, 6 the implementing legislation for the Hague Convention on
Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, 7 is a revolutionary move. Under
ICARA and the Convention, a child who has been abducted to the
United States by an American parent must be promptly returned to
her pre-abduction home." While this action thwarts the efforts of the
U.S. citizen, it ultimately ensures the prompt return of the American
children abducted to foreign countries pursuant to the broader sense
of reciprocity under the Convention.
Apart from the cultural and political concerns of sovereign nations,
the Hague Convention and ICARA also reach the more personal and
immediate needs of the parents. The practical problems which ac-
company the emotional turmoil experienced by a parent seeking the
4. Id. at 82 (statement of David W. Lloyd, General Counsel, National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children).
5. Id. at 93 (testimony of Holly Planells, President, American Children Held Hostage).
Although her son was born in Jordan, he lived in the United States from shortly after birth
until he was abducted at age 5. Believing that her son should be raised in the United States,
Ms. Planells stated, "He was a hostage in a foreign land despite his dual nationality. He did
not know anything about Jordan, its language, its people and its powerful religio[n]. He was
as much of an American as me." Id.
6. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437
(1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1988)) [hereinafter ICARA].
7. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, October 25, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 1501, reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,498 (1986) [hereinafter Hague Convention or
Convention].
8. See infra text accompanying notes 158-63.
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return of an abducted child are particularly acute when the child has
been taken out of the country. Language barriers, different legal
systems, and sheer distance greatly add to costs for legal represen-
tation and investigative services necessary to find the child. Further-
more, it is often difficult for the aggrieved parent to obtain effective
assistance from state authorities in the country to which the child
has been taken.9
The most devastating effects of child abductions are felt by the
children themselves. Although parents are the persons best suited to
understand the child's needs and to decide with whom the child
should live upon a marital break-up, the discord resulting from
separation or divorce often causes the parents to argue over custody-
with each unwilling to compromise in the interest of the child. If the
parents do not reach agreement regarding custody, the courts must
step in and resolve the issue. A parent who fears she will lose a
court battle, or who is dissatisfied with a custody decision, may
resort to self-help by simply taking the child and starting life anew
in another location. "Child-snatching" 10 unwittingly has been en-
couraged by the U.S. legal system because, oftentimes, the abducting
parent is able to move out of state, re-open litigation, and be awarded
custody by a court in the new jurisdiction.1 This same phenomenon
occurs on an international level. Instead of receiving parental support
in adjusting to the family break-up, the child becomes a pawn in the
battle between her parents. 12 By mandating the immediate return of
9. Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at 110-11. The following
passage reflects the dilemma confronting a parent when his child had been abducted from the
United States and taken to another country:
Most Americans who experience the abduction of a child across international frontiers
are at a complete loss about what to do and where to turn. There is no office in
this country that is equipped to give them the necessary aid and direction. If they
travel to the country where they presume the child to be, seeking help from the
authorities, they find themselves shunted from one agency to another with no one
office charged with responsibility to assist them. Attorneys in both countries run
into the same difficulties, especially when the whereabouts of the abductor and child
are unknown. They can attest to the enormous expenditures for travel, detective
services, and other costs incurred by their clients in foreign abduction cases, not to
speak of the emotional stress and strain involved.
Id.
10. "Child-snatching" is a term used to refer to the act of a non-custodial parent taking
or failing to return a child despite a custody order. A. LOWENFELD, CONFLCT OF LAWS § 9.04,
at 827 (1986).
11. Id. at 835.
12. UN r. CHIMD CUSTODY JURISDICTiON ACT, 9 U.L.A. 115, 116 (1968) [hereinafter
UCCJA]. In a prefatory note, the U.L.A. commissioners acknowledged that the emotional
harm done to children who have been abducted as a result of a custody dispute "can hardly
be overestimated .... A child who has never been given the chance to develop a sense of
belonging and whose personal attachments when beginning to form are cruelly disrupted, may
well be crippled for life, to his own lasting detriment and the detriment of society." Id.
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children, the Hague Convention and ICARA attempt to reduce the
incentive to abduct.
In the spirit of international cooperation to deter parental child
abductions globally, and with an eye toward securing the return of
American children wrongfully removed to foreign lands, the United
States ratified the Hague Convention on December 31, 1981. By
joining the Convention, the United States hoped "to spare children
the detrimental emotional effects associated with transnational pa-
rental kidnapping."" Member countries to the Hague Convention
1 4
recognize that the problem of international child abductions cannot
be solved by each country's solitary efforts to keep "their" children
within "their" borders."5 They agree that concerted efforts between
countries are necessary to deter parents from abducting children and
to promote fair, uniform resolutions of subsequent custody claims.
16
Cooperation also promotes trust between countries, encouraging them
to return abducted children with the knowledge that other countries
will do likewise. Nations, while retaining their paternalistic powers
over children, have greater opportunity to look at the abduction
problem less emotionally than parents engaged in a legal battle. A
rational approach would call for looking to the protection of "all
our" children, not merely the children of a particular nation. The
Hague Convention had this notion in mind when it acknowledged
13. Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to President Ronald
Reagan (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,495 (1986).
14. The 29 member nations to the Hague Conference are: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Surinam, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela,
and Yugoslavia. International Child Abductions: A Guide to Applying the 1988 Hague
Convention with Forms, 1989 A.B.A. SEc. FAm. L. 13 n.23 (G. DeHart ed.) [hereinafter
A.B.A. Guide].
15. See 134 CONG. REc. H1174 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1988) (statement of Rep. Lantos).
Mr. Lantos testified:
[Tihis implementing legislation.. .is a long overdue U.S. response to a heart-
wrenching problem. Several countries are now fully participating in the convention,
and as we become a partner in the convention most of the European nations are
poised to join us. In my discussions with representatives with both the European
parliaments and different European legislatures, I have heard a great deal of support
for a system to return children wrongfully taken from their country by a noncustodial
parent. I think we can safely say that with the implementing bill, the legislation
before us, we will join a larger international community of nations committed to
bringing children back to their parents.
Id. at H1176-77.
16. H.R. ReP. No. 525, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CoNa. &
ADIm. NEws 386 [hereinafter H.R. PEP. No. 525].
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"that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters
relating to custody.
'17
This comment examines the Hague Convention and ICARA to
determine the extent to which they deter future parental child ab-
ductions and further the interests of abducted children as well as
those of the aggrieved parent. The analysis begins by discussing the
issues resulting from the underlying custody determinations, and
evaluating the impact of past and current domestic law on child
abductions, as well as on the Hague Convention and ICARA. Two
recent U.S. legislative enactments, the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA) 8 are analyzed as to their attempts to address international
child abduction and their interplay with the Hague Convention and
ICARA. 19 The comment also discusses the Strasbourg Convention, 20
an earlier international convention which addressed parental child
abductions. Finally, the comment analyzes the administration and
procedures of the Hague Convention and its U.S. implementing
legislation, ICARA, with a comparison of how these acts differ from
past efforts to deter international child abductions.
II. THE NAT URE OF THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM: RESOLVING
CUSTODIAL DisPuTEs IN TiE COu1RTs
While the Hague Convention does not address the underlying merits
of custody disputes, the potential or existing custody decision is often
the cause of the abduction. Whether a custody decree is already in
effect or is yet to be decided, the parent contemplating an abduction
often seeks to litigate or relitigate the custody issue in the forum of
his choice, since that forum may likely rule in his favor. Historically,
"forum shopping ' 2 1 has proven lucrative in the United States, thus
encouraging abductions. For a case in which the aggrieved parent is
foreign, forum shopping often could mean protracted and burden-
17. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at preamble; 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
18. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980) (codified
as amended in scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter PKPA].
19. Depending on the law invoked (the UCCJA, the PKPA, or the Hague Convention),
the court may not be required to resolve the underlying custody issue. See infra notes 164-71
and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 126-52 and accompanying text.
21. See Miller v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 923, 943, 587 P.2d 723, 151 Cal. Rptr. 6
(1978). Forum shopping refers to the actions of non-custodial parents, unhappy with a custody
decree, who abduct their children in order to obtain a more favorable decision in another
jurisdiction. Id.
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
some litigation in the United States. When an American parent
abducts a child from the child's foreign parent, the foreign parent
seeking the child's return through the use of ICARA must utilize
U.S. courts.Y2 Therefore, a discussion of the development of child
custody law in the United States is important to an understanding
of what the foreign parent will encounter. This discussion will also
provide United States parents with an idea of what they might
encounter abroad should they need to invoke the Hague Convention.
A. Balancing the Interests of the Government, the Parents, and
the Child
Distinct but related interests that must be considered in a custody
suit include those of each parent, the child, and the government. A
parent's psychological interest in rearing his child and enjoying the
child's company is recognized as a fundamental aspect of American
society.23 Acknowledged legal rights of the parents include the right
of childrearing-to exercise custody of their children. 24 Although the
child is the subject of the suit, and the custody determination is
made to further the child's well-being, the child is not considered a
party to the suit.25 The child's interests are not protected adequately
in a custody proceeding in which the attorneys represent only the
parents as parties to the suit.26 Likewise, the judge has not been
found to be the proper representative of the child since the judge
guides the proceeding in relation to counsels' advocacy for the
parents. 27 Finally, each government has an interest not only in
22. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 12; 19 I.L.M. at 1502. The judicial or
administrative authority of the Contracting State in which the abducted child is located
conducts the judicial proceedings under the Convention. Id.
23. H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DomHsTC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATEs 789 (2d ed.
1988) [hereinafter CLARK, LAw OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS]. Clark notes that the parents' interests
"must be given some weight, not merely because they are related to the child's welfare, but
because we recognize that a parent's interest in the training, upbringing and companionship
of his child has an independent importance in our society which must be respected." Id.
24. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). See also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (providing a history of cases which consider due process
rights in relation to child custody issues).
25. Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 294 (1986)
[hereinafter Blakesley].
26. Schepard, Cooperative Custody, 64 TEx. L. REv. 687, 736 (1985) [hereinafter Sche-
pard]; Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody & Visitation
Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1134 (1978).
27. Schepard, supra note 26, at 736; Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody
Decisions: All that Glitters is Not Gault, 15 J. FAm. L. 27, 29-36 (1976-77).
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protecting the legal rights of its citizens-children as well as parents-
but in promoting uniform laws regulating family life. 28
These interests often conflict. As the interests of one party are
fostered, the interests of one or more of the other parties may be
jeopardized. 29 Unfortunately, the adversarial nature of custody pro-
ceedings encourages the physical and psychological manipulation of
the child by the parents in order to gain custody. 0 This tension
between the parents' interests and the child's interest is unavoidable
so long as custody is decided in an adversarial court proceeding."
B. Historical Development of Custody Jurisdiction in U.S. Courts
The adversarial nature of custody proceedings, which aggravates
the problem of forum shopping, both affects and is affected by the
courts' ability to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. Child custody
law in the United States is fraught with ambiguity and confusion
regarding jurisdiction over custody decrees.
3 2
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the domicile
3
of the child provided the sole basis for jurisdiction in custody cases.
34
Although the domicile theory was advantageous in that it established
28. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). Traditionally, the United States government
has taken an active role in the regulation of family life, as expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Maynard: "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the legislature." Id.
29. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 380. "The interests of the parents, the child and the
states concerned ought to be balarfced in the child custody setting .... Society's interest in
thwarting child snatching would go into the balance." Id.
30. Schepard, supra note 26, at 737-38.
31. Bodenheimer, The International Kidnapping of Children: The United States Approach,
11 FAM. L.Q. 83, 99-100 (1977) [hereinafter Bodenheimer, The U.S. Approach]. Counseling
and educational programs are being developed to foster conciliatory, non-coercive custody
decisions between parents who are faced with custody decisions. Id. See also Schepard, supra
note 26, at 735-43.
32. See generally Blakesley, supra note 25, at 291-97. Part of the ambiguity exists because
courts have not distinguished between subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction gives a court the power to adjudicate the matter itself while personal
jurisdiction gives the court power to bind the persons involved. In the United States, both are
required. See infra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
33. "Domicile" is defined as "that place where a man has his true, fixed, and permanent
home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of
returning." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (5th ed. 1979).
34. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 291. The rationale for the domicile theory was that each
state holds jurisdiction to determine the civil status of its inhabitants; custody suits determine
the child's status. Therefore, the state in which the child is domiciled has jurisdiction to hear
the custody case regarding that child. Under this theory, the courts did not concern themselves
with in personam jurisdiction. Id. at 291 n.2. For a discussion of the role in personam
jurisdiction now plays in custody suits, see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction in only one state at a time, it was criticized for not
taking the child's welfare into proper account. 35 Critics believed that
the state of the child's domicile was not necessarily the best forum
to decide custody of the child.16 Another state might share an equal
or greater interest in the dispute, as well as greater access to necessary
evidence, in which case that state should be able to exercise jurisdic-
tion. 37
In 1947, two landmark cases widened and clarified the scope in
which states could find jurisdiction over child custody disputes. First,
in Sampsell v. Superior Court,8 the California Supreme Court held
that concurrent jurisdiction could exist in both the state of the child's
domicile and the state of the child's residence or presence if that
state had a "substantial interest" in the welfare of the child.39 Second,
in Halvey v. Halvey,40 the U.S. Supreme Court announced that a
custody decree issued in one state was entitled to recognition and
enforcement in sister states to the extent that the original state could
enforce the decree. 41 Consequently, a sister state could find concurrent
jurisdiction and modify the existing custody decree to the same extent
as the state which originally issued the decree.42
Following Sampsell and Halvey, courts found jurisdiction based
on one or more of the following factors: the child was domiciled in-
state; the court held personal jurisdiction over one or both parents;
the child or at least one parent lived in-state. 43 Upon finding juris-
diction under one of these alternative bases, a court virtually was
free to adjudicate the custody determination in the child's best
interests. 4 The result was that many courts took advantage of the
35. CLA, LAw OF Do~msrc REAxTIoNs, supra note 23, at 457. The critics argued that
more than one state often assumed jurisdiction for custody cases and, even though stating
they were following the domicile rule, they were in fact using other factors, primarily the
welfare of the child, to determine jurisdiction. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
39. Id. at 779.
40. People of the State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
41. Id. at 614. The Court stated that a custody decree "has no constitutional claim to a
more conclusive or final effect in the State of the forum than it has in the State where
rendered." Id.
42. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (South Carolina could exercise jurisdiction
to modify Virginia custody decision since decision had no res judicata effect in Virginia).
43. See, e.g., Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948) (jurisdiction
based on child's domicile within the state); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197
P.2d 739 (1948) (jurisdiction based on child's residence in state); Van Gundy v. Van Gundy,
244 Iowa 488, 56 N.W.2d 43 (1952) (jurisdiction based on parent's domicile in-state); Green
v. Green, 351 Mass. 466, 221 N.E.2d 857 (1966) (personal jurisdiction over one or both
parents).
44. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 292.
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"best interests of the child" rationale to exercise modification juris-
diction rather than defer to the forum which issued the original
custody decree.45 Often a court would hear a custody case which had
already been decided; or one court would initiate custody proceedings
even though another court was already in the process of deciding
the same case. 4 The ability of state courts to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction over a custody case created uncertainty regarding the
validity of original custody decrees and modifications to original
decrees.47
A 1953 U.S. Supreme Court decision, May v. Anderson,48 further
added to the jurisdictional confusion in custody battles. In May, the
Court held that in personam jurisdiction4 9 over the respondent was
necessary in order to bind the respondent to a custody order.50 In
his dissent, Justice Jackson vigorously criticized the majority opinion
for treating child custody as a property right of the parent and for
ignoring the child's welfare.5 1 Contemporary state court decisions
45. S. KATz, CEILD SNATCHING 61-71 (1981) [hereinafter KATz]. Since states have the
ability to hold concurrent jurisdiction in custody matters, parents were able to forum shop
for favorable jurisdictions which would be willing to modify prior custody decrees. "Forum
shopping" is a phrase which denotes the strategic advantage a party gains by having a suit
litigated in a particular forum. The ability to forum shop encouraged parents who were
dissatisfied with a prior custody decree to abduct their child and move to a jurisdiction that
did not give much deference to sister state decrees and which was willing to modify existing
decrees from other states. Id.
The clean hands doctrine was used to prevent parents from taking undue advantage of the
ability to forum shop and to deter parental child abductions. Under the clean hands doctrine,
"a parent who has taken a child to a second state in violation of an existing custody decree
should not be allowed to bring a modification action in the second state." Id. at 65.
Unfortunately, the clean hands doctrine was not entirely successful in limiting the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction or in deterring parental child abductions. Id. at 66-67.
46. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (changed circumstances allow
modification of sister-state custody decree).
47. KA z, supra note 45, at 61-71. Custody proceedings, unlike most other types of
judicial proceedings, are not considered final judgements because they are potentially modifi-
able. Sampsell v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 2d 763, 780, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
48. 345 U.S. 528 (1953). In May, the Court invalidated the father's custody decree because
the Wisconsin court which issued it did not have personal jurisdiction over the mother, who
was living in Ohio. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Burton stated, "In the instant case,
we recognize that a mother's right to custody of her children is a personal right entitled to at
least as much protection as her right to alimony." Id. at 534.
For an in-depth analysis of this case, see Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamable to Family
Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. Rnv. 379 (1959) [hereinafter Hazard].
49. In personam jurisdiction, as an aspect of personal jurisdiction, refers to the authority
of the court over the parties to the suit. CLARK, LAW OF Dommssc RELATiONS, supra note 23,
at 456.
50. May, 345 U.S. at 534.
51. Id. at 541 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Jackson argued that:
The difference between a proceeding involving the status, custody and support of
children and one involving adjudication of property rights is too apparent to require
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regarding personal jurisdiction over the respondent parent in a cus-
tody suit often ignore or circumvent May.52 Some jurisdictions ac-
complish noncompliance with May by characterizing custody suits as
determinations of the child's status, for which personal jurisdiction
over the respondent parent is unnecessary.5 3 Other jurisdictions have
found personal jurisdiction through the use of long-arm statutes.
5 4
Regardless of the theory offered, the courts' willingness to make and
modify custody decrees resulted in a jurisdictional nightmare which
aggravated the problem of parental child abductions, both domestic
and international.
5
III. NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE THE
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF EXsTING CUSTODY DECREES
By the 1960s, repeated modifications of custody decrees and child
snatching flourished in the United States.56 Two domestic pieces of
elaboration. In the former, courts are no longer concerned primarily with the
proprietary claims of the contestants for the "res" before the court, but with the
welfare of the "res" itself. Custody is viewed not with the idea of adjudicating
rights in the children, as if they were chattels, but rather with the idea of making
the best disposition possible for the welfare of the children. To speak of a court's
"cutting off" a mother's right to custody of her children, as if it raised problems
similar to those involved in "cutting off" her rights in a plot of ground, is to
obliterate these obvious distinctions. Personal jurisdiction of all parties to be affected
by a proceeding is highly desirable, to make certain that they have had valid notice
and opportunity to be heard. But the assumption that it overrides all other consid-
erations and in its absence a state is constitutionally impotent to resolve questions
of custody flies in the face of our own cases.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See also H. Clark Jr., CASES AND PROBILMS ON DOMESTIC RLATIONS 1029-40 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter CLARK, CASEs & PROBLEMS] (discussing implications of May). See generally Hazard,
supra note 48, at 390-406 (critique of controversy surrounding May).
52. See CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 461-63 (discussing
implications of May). While some states rely on May "as their reason for refusing to enforce
the custody decrees of other states, ... [d]ecisions in other states have taken positions contrary
to the apparent holding in May v. Anderson, either by ignoring that case, by giving it a
limited construction, or by rejecting its teaching outright." Id. at 462 (footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 469. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Susan Hudson and Ronald R. Hudson, 434
N.E.2d 107, 117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (custody determination is adjudication of child's status;
personal jurisdiction of respondent not required).
54. E. ScoLEs & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 526 (1982) [hereinafter ScoLEs & HAY]. The
use of long-arm statutes provides jurisdiction over a spouse who has left the state where the
other spouse remains. Long-arm statutes are not applicable when both parents have left the
state of the marital domicile; in that event, the state will probably not be able to exert personal
jurisdiction over the spouse. Id.
55. UCCJA, supra note 12, at preface; 9 U.L.A. at 115. In their prefatory note, the
Commissioners noted the "growing public concern over the fact that every year thousands of
children are shifted from state to state, and to other countries, as well as from one family to
another, while their parents battle over their custody in the court of several jurisdictions." Id.
at 115-16.
56. R. CROUCH, INTERSTATE CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO USE AND COURT INTER-
PRETATION OF THE UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT iX (1981) [hereinafter CROUCH].
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legislation emerged in an attempt to curb the increasing numbers of
parents engaged in modification-induced forum shopping and child
abductions. In 1968, to remedy "the chaotic condition of interjuris-
dictional custody law, ' 57 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws58 adopted the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA).5 9 Then, in 1980, Congress enacted the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)6W to complement the mandates
of the UCCJA and to strengthen certain weaknesses which had
become apparent in it.61 While the United States struggled to enact
effective domestic custody legislation, other countries were addressing
the problem of international child abductions .62 By 1972, the Euro-
pean Ministers of Justice had begun investigating problems of inter-
national child abductions. On May 20, 1980 they opened for signature
the European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of De-
cisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Cus-
tody of Children (hereinafter the Strasbourg Convention).
63
57. See Bodenheimer, The U.S. Approach, supra note 31, at 91.
58. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, organized in 1892,
promotes uniformity in state laws by drafting proposals of legislation designed to be adopted by
individual state governments. The Commission includes members from each state, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico. The Commission is composed of judges, lawyers, law school professors
and legislators. 9 U.L.A. III (1988).
59. UCCJA, supra note 12, at preface; 9 U.L.A. at 116.
60. PKPA, supra note 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982 & Supp. 1988).
61. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 296. These weaknesses included variances in how states
enacted the UCCJA, partly due to ambiguous language which was interpreted differently among
jurisdictions. For examples of different interpretations and ambiguities, see CL&RK, LAv oF
Domarsrlc RELATiONS, supra note 23, at 473.
62. The Hague Convention Concerning the Powers of Authorities and the Law Applicable
in respect of the Protection of Infants (Hague X), opened for signature Oct. 5, 1961, 658 U.N.T.S.
143 [hereinafter 1961 Convention]. The 1961 Convention attempted to establish rules governing
the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody decisions. However, the members of the
Convention were unable to reach an agreement regarding enforcement of custody decisions, and
the Convention has been deemed essentially ineffectual. The Council of Europe incorporated ideas
from the 1961 Convention and prepared a Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Custody Decisions, along with a proposal for a complementary Convention which would establish
an international tribunal to resolve conflicting custody decisions. Droz & Dyer, The Hague
Conference and the Main Issues of Private International Law for the Eighties, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 155, 205-06 (1981) [hereinafter Droz & Dyer]. The 1961 Convention did not address the
problem of parental kidnapping. Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at
101 n.17. For a discussion of the 1961 Convention, see Comment, Law and Treaty Responses to
International Child Abductions, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 669, 688-89 (1980) [hereinafter Comment,
Treaty Responses].
63. European Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Child
Custody and on Restoration of Custody of Children, May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 273 [hereinafter
Strasbourg Convention]. The Council of Europe first considered the topic of international child
abductions at their Seventh Conference (Basle, May 15-18, 1972). The Council established a
committee of governmental experts empowered to draft a Convention. In 1976, the Swiss delegates
presented a draft Convention. By 1979, the Committee had drafted a Convention which incor-
porated suggestions from the Swiss delegates. Stotter, The Light at the End of the Tunnel: The
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction Has Reached Capitol Hill, 9 HAsI Nrs INT'L
& Comp. L. REv. 285, 303 (1985-86) [hereinafter Stotter].
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A. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)
1. Purpose and Objectives
The most pervasive non-federal statutory response to child custody
and child abductions is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA). The UCCJA is a compilation of suggested regulations
which become binding on a state only when the state has adopted
them, with or without modification. 4 Not a reciprocal law, the
UCCJA applies regardless of whether the foreign jurisdiction has
adopted it.65 The Act specifies general objectives intended to promote
cooperation between states in determining which forum shall exercise
initial custody jurisdiction,6 and provides rules regarding modifica-
tion of existing custody decrees.67 The UCCJA attempts to deter
child abductions by mandating full faith and credit 8 to sister-state
and foreign-country custody decrees.
2. Jurisdictional Requirements
The UCCJA provides four different bases that can be used to
assert subject matter jurisdiction over initial custody determinations
as well as for modification of existing decrees.6 9 Regardless of which
64. UCCJA, supra note 12; 9 U.L.A. at III. The Act has been adopted in various forms
by every state in the United States, and by the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.
For a detailed discussion of the various versions of the UCCJA adopted by the states, see
Blakesley, supra note 25, at 316-25. For a table of state code citations, see CRoucH, supra
note 56, at 75-82.
65. See Miller v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 923, 935-36 n.8, 587 P.2d 723, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 6 (1978).
66. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 1; 9 U.L.A. at 123-24. The nine general purposes of the
UCCJA specified in Section 1 are: 1) avoid jurisdictional competition, so that the child is not
coritinually shifted from one state to another in order for the parents to forum shop; 2)
promote cooperation among the courts, so that a custody decree is made in the state which
can best promote the interests of the child; 3) assure that custody litigation ordinarily takes
place in the state in which the family has closest connection; 4) deter continuing custody
litigation, thereby promoting greater home stability for the child; 5) deter abductions aimed
at obtaining custody awards; 6) avoid re-litigation once a custody decree has been issued; 7)
facilitate enforcement of custody decrees; 8) promote the exchange of information and assistance
between various state courts having an interest in the child; and 9) promote uniformity among
the states which enact the law. Id.
67. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
68. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
69. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3; 9 U.L.A. at 143.
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jurisdictional basis is used, the child's presence in itself is not
determinative. Even if the child and the parent are both in the state,
the court may determine that jurisdictional requirements of the
UCCJA have not been met.70 Conversely, the court may assert
jurisdiction without the child being present in the state.
71
The two primary bases which allow a court to exercise jurisdiction
are the "home state" 72 basis and the "child's best interest" basis.
73
While the "home state" basis establishes that a court in the child's
home state has original jurisdiction to decide a custody suit, another
state having equal or stronger ties with the child may share concurrent
jurisdiction in the "child's best interest." ' 74 In order to assert "child's
best interest" as the basis for jurisdiction, the court must find: 1)
the child and at least one parent have a significant connection to the
state; and 2) substantial evidence regarding the child's present and
future welfare is available in the state.
75
A state court may also exercise jurisdiction if the child has been
abandoned or requires emergency protection from abuse or neglect
and is present in the state.76 Finally, a court may assert jurisdiction
70. Id.; 9 U.L.A. at 144. See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 64 Haw. 553, 645 P.2d 300, 306
(1982) (physical presence of child and mother in Hawaii for only one month insufficient to
allow assertion of jurisdiction).
71. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3(c); 9 U.L.A. at 144. See, e.g., Middleton v. Middleton,
227 Va. 82, 314 S.E.2d 362 (1984) (physical presence of child not required for Virginia to
assert custody jurisdiction where child wrongfully taken to England by mother).
72. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 2; 9 U.L.A. at 143-44. "Home state" is defined as the
state in which the child lived with a parent or someone acting as a parent, for at least the six
months prior to the present action (or if the child is less than six months old, then from the
time of birth). Id.
73. Id. at § 3; 9 U.L.A. at 144. See also Blakesley, supra note 25, at 299-302.
74. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3 comments; 9 U.L.A. at 144. The term "closest
connection" signifies the state that is best able to exercise jurisdiction in the child's interest,
because it has the most significant evidence regarding the child's present or future care and
personal relationships. The child, as well as one of his parents, should have a close connection
to the state exercising jurisdiction. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 299. For an example of an
application of the "significant connections" basis, see Bigelow v. Bigelow, 119 Mich. App.
784, 327 N.W.2d 361 (1982) (California and Michigan had equal connections, Michigan could
rule on child custody to promote general principles of UCCJA).
75. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3; 9 U.L.A. at 143-44. See also Bolson v. Bolson, 394
N.W.2d 361, 364 (Iowa 1986) (sufficient evidence for jurisdiction based on child's best interest
since children resided in California for only one month but previously resided in Iowa for five
years; grandparents and father still domiciled in Iowa).
76. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3(a)(3); 9 U.L.A. at 144. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson,
433 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Florida could not exercise emergency jurisdiction
because alleged mistreatment not occurring within state); Roberts v. Dist. Ct. of Larimer Co.,
198 Colo. 79, 596 P.2d 65 (1979) (father's allegations that child was underweight and needed
dental care did not show sufficient emergency situation).
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if no other state is able, or if another state defers jurisdiction and
it is in the best interests of the child.
77
Jurisdiction to modify a custody decision is further restricted by
the UCCJA's requirement that states recognize and enforce sister-
state and foreign-country custody decrees. 78 If concurrent jurisdiction
exists, sections six through eight of the UCCJA govern which forum
should actually exercise jurisdiction and whether that forum should
honor a prior custody decree. If an action is pending, a second
forum may not exercise jurisdiction unless the initial forum stays the
proceeding. 79 Pursuant to section 7, a court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction on grounds of forum non conveniens or in deference to
another forum whose exercise of jurisdiction will be in the best
interests of the child.80 Section 8 codifies the "clean hands doctrine"
by allowing a court to decline jurisdiction if it determines that the
parent initiating the proceeding has acted wrongfully-abducted the
child-and the denial is just under the circumstances.8' A potential
77. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3(a)(4); 9 U.L.A. 144. See also In re B.R.F., a minor,
669 S.W.2d 240, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (Missouri appellate court held New Jersey could
properly assume jurisdiction after mother died, where grandmother in state and no other state
met UCCJA jurisdictional requirements).
78. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 13; 9 U.L.A. at 276. See also Bodenhemier, The U.S.
Approach, supra note 31, at 92.
79. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 6; 9 U.L.A. at 219. If a state were to exercise jurisdiction
contrary to the guidelines of the UCCJA, any judgment made by the court would not be
recognized by sister-states. See CROUCH, supra note 56, at 26-33.
80. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 7; 9 U.L.A. at 233-34. See, e.g., Tiscornia v. Tiscornia,
154 Ariz. 376, 742 P.2d 1362 (1987). In Tiscornia, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the forum non conveniens
provisions of Section 8 of the UCCJA. Upon their separation, the parents agreed that the
children would live with their mother in France, while the father remained in Arizona. When
the father sought to modify visitation rights under the agreement in Arizona, the court
determined that France had closer ties to the children and the mother and therefore, that the
French court was the proper forum. Id. at 1363.
81. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 8; 9 U.L.A. at 251. The clean hands doctrine allows
concurrent jurisdiction but limits exercise of that jurisdiction. This, in turn, makes it unlikely
that courts will exercise jurisdiction where a parent has wrongfully abducted unless the child's
welfare is in danger. ScoLzs & HAY, supra note 54, at 523-29. See also Pace v. Pace, 510 So.
2d 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). Applying the clean hands doctrine, the Florida District
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction under the UCCJA and
upheld the trial court's order permitting the wife to move the child to the country of Aruba
(where she resided) even though the child's father claimed he held a California court order
preventing the child's removal. Id. at 1032. The mother had been awarded temporary custody
in Florida in 1982, after which her husband abducted the child, kept the child hidden from
the mother, and fraudulently obtained a California custody order. Id. at 1031. The Florida
trial court based its assertion of jurisdiction on the facts that the parties were married in
Florida, had raised their child there, and had obtained divorce and custody decrees in Florida.
Id. at 1032. The court also refused to reward the father's success in secreting the child for so
long by allowing a change of forum. Id. The clean hands doctrine is limited, however, as
shown in Schmidt v. Schmidt, 227 N.J. Super. 528, 548 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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problem arises under the UCCJA when concurrent jurisdiction is
possible and neither parent holds a valid custody decree. Under these
circumstances, the'parents may engage in a "race to the courthouse"
in order to commence proceedings in their respective, preferred
forum, often overlooking the interests of their child in order to
satisfy their own interests.
82
Under the UCCJA, personal jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to
adjudication of the custody dispute. However, in order to comply
with the Supreme Court plurality in May v. Anderson,83 both personal
and subject matter jurisdiction must exist in order for sister-state
courts to grant full faith and credit to the original decree. 84 The issue
which remains unsettled, therefore, is whether or not a custody decree
made pursuant to the UCCJA but without personal jurisdiction over
the respondent is valid, or can be afforded full faith and credit.85
1988). In Schmidt, the abducting parent-the mother-succeeded in convincing the New Jersey
Superior Court to exercise jurisdiction over custody of her child based on the fact that she
had provided adequate notice to the aggrieved father and had asserted "best interests" of the
child. In Schmidt, the father, a West German citizen, and the mother, an American citizen,
lived in West Germany where their first child was born. The mother fled to New Jersey with
their son when he was a year and a half old. The father obtained an ex parte order for the
return of his son from the West German court. When the mother refused to return the child,
the father filed an action in the New Jersey state court to enforce the West German court
order. The New Jersey court held that it had jurisdiction to decide the custody issue, and that
the doctrine of forum non conveniens did not require the case to be transferred to West
Germany. Id. at 196. Upon finding that the father's exparte order was unenforceable because
the order was obtained without proper notice to the wife, the court concluded that the UCCJA
does not require recognition and enforcement of the West German custody decree. Id. at 198.
The court noted that the child had been in the United States for a total of 19 months, due
to a trial delay. Id. Because the child had become settled in New Jersey, the court ruled that
it would be in the best interest of the -hild to have the case heard in New Jersey. Id. Although
the court recognized the mother's abduction of the child, it reasoned that New Jersey should
take jurisdiction in order to prevent "the child [from becoming] a pawn in a jurisdictional
chess game." Id. at 199. Thus, the clean hands doctrine did not prevent the abducting parent
from obtaining jurisdiction in the forum of her choice. This case exemplifies how a parent
might abduct a child and, through procedural technicalities, be allowed to obtain a favorable
custody judgment in the United States under the UCCJA.
82. See Blakesley, supra note 25, at 365.
83. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
84. Id. at 528-29. Justice Burton delivererd the opinion of the Court:
The question presented is whether, in a habeus corpus proceeding attacking the right
of a mother to retain possession of her minor children, an Ohio court must give
full faith and credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody of the children to their
father when that decree is obtained by the father in an ex parte divorce action in a
Wisconsin court which had no personal jurisdiction over the mother. For the reasons
hereafter stated, our answer is no.
Id.
85. CLARK, LAW OF Do.Nisnic RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 469. See also Blakesley, supra
note 25, at 340. For an example of different treatment by states, see McAtee v. McAtee, 323
S.E.2d 611, 612 (V. Va. 1984) (circuit court has jurisdiction to award custody to one parent
without obtaining personal jurisdiction over the other); Hart v. Hart, 74 N.C. App. 1, 327
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The jurisdictional bases of the UCCJA are designed to assure not
only that one state exercises jurisdiction at any given time, but also
that jurisdiction is premised on the interests of the child, rather than
on the convenience or interests of the parents. 86 Although the guide-
lines for jurisdiction improved judicial cooperation between sister-
states, they have not achieved the desired uniformity in judicial
determinations. 87 Commentators have specifically criticized the lan-
guage of the UCCJA for being too flexible and vague, thus making
the Act vulnerable to multiple interpretations.88 The UCCJA has not
completely resolved the problems of "home state favoritism" nor
the misuse of the "best interests of the child" test to determine
jurisdiction.8 9
3. International Application
Absent legislation, foreign country custody decrees are recognized
and enforced under principles of comity.90 The Recognition of Foreign
S.E.2d 631, 635 (1985) (UCCJA does not require personal jurisdiction over non-resident
parent). Cf. Dean v. Dean, 447 So. 2d 733, 735 (Ala. 1984) (child custody proceeding is in
personam proceeding requiring in personam jurisdiction).
86. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 302.
87. See generally Sampson, What's Wrong with the UCCJA? Punitive Decrees and
Hometown Decisions Are Making a Mockery of this Uniform Act, 3 FAM. L. ADvoc. 28
(1981); KATz, supra note 45, at 30-33; Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and
Excessive Modifications, 65 CAIF. L. REv. 978 (1977).
88. BIakesley, supra note 25, at 359. Some examples of ambiguity include interpretations
of the application of "unclean hands" and "inconvenient forum." See CLARK, LAW OF
DoMSTic RELATIONs, supra note 23, at 472-73.
89. Blakesley, supra note 25, at 359. Blakesley noted that the "PKPA and the UCCJA
expressly include the 'best interests of the child' as a basis of jurisdiction. Whether or not the
potential for abuse has been minimized successfully is not clear at this time." Id. at 315-16
(footnote omitted). These observations suggest the difficulty of quantifying an acceptable level
of application of the "best interests of the child" test.
90. "Comity" is defined as the principle that "courts of one state or jurisdiction will
give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of
obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed.
1979); See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895). In Hilton, the court noted that:
Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurispru-
dence likely to secure an impartial administation of justice between the citizens of
its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting, or fraud
in procuring the judgment or any other special reason why comity of this nation
should not allow it full effect, the merits of this case should not ... be tried afresh
... upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law
or in fact.
Id.
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Nations Judgments section of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, section 98, states: "A valid judgment rendered in a foreign
nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized
in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the underlying
cause of action are concerned." Comment b of section 98 of the
Second Restatement supplies the rationale that "[j]udgments rendered
in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full faith
and credit. In most respects, however, such judgments, provided that
they are valid under the rule of section 92, will be accorded the same
degree of recognition to which sister state judgments are entitled." 9'
Commentators disagree on the extent to which foreign-country cus-
tody decrees have been given recognition and enforcement in U.S.
state courts. 92 However, in the United States there is general agree-
ment that if a foreign parent takes a child from the United States
in violation of a U.S. custody decree, the home country of the
abducting foreign parent often finds reason to deny the child's return
to the United States. The United States perceives a situation in which
"most foreign countries will exercise independent jurisdiction based
upon the child's presence in their territory and will decide who is
entitled to custody based upon their own domestic relations laws."
'93
91. REsTATEMENT (SEcor) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §92 (1971). Under Section 92, a sister-
state judgment is considered val4d if:
(a) the state in which it is rendered has jurisdiction to act judicially in the case; and
(b) a reasonable method of notification is employed and a reasonable opportunity
to be heard is afforded to persons affected; and
(c) the judgment is rendered by a competent court; and
(d) there is compliance with such requirements of the state of rendition as are
necessary for the valid exercise of power by the court.
Id.
92. Bodenheimer, The U.S. Approach, supra note 31, at 86. See also Blakesley, supra
note 25, at 372-73. Blakesley states: "The amount of respect given a decree from a foreign
nation varies from state to state and from fact situation to fact situation, although the available
cases show a willingness to recognize foreign decrees based on laws which comport with or
approximate UCCJA standards." Id. Cf. Comment, Treaty Responses, supra note 62, at 669
(recognition and enforcement of foreign country custody decrees is more speculative). The
Comment states that "[w]ith few exceptions, state courts have chosen to relitigate child custody
cases rather than enforce foreign nation decrees." Id. at 674.
For an example of a state application, see In re Marriage of Ben-Yehoshua, 91 Cal. App.
3d 259, 154 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1979), in which the California Court of Appeals enforced an Israeli
custody decree made after the father had snatched children away from the mother in California.
The court found that even though the father had taken the children back to their homeland,
the Israeli court had closer connections to the children and was better able to decide custody.
Id. at 84-86.
93. Parental Kidnaping: Hearings on S98-472 before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings of
May 25, 1983] (statement of James G. Hergen, Assistant Legal Adviser of Consular Affairs,
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Given this perception of the way in which foreign courts handled
custody suits, the UCCJA Commissioners took a .bold stance in
drafting section 23-the provision which authorizes the Act's inter-
national application:
The general policies of this Act extend to the international area.
The provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and enforce-
ment of custody decrees of other states apply to custody decrees
and decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody
institutions rendered by appropriate authorities of other nations if
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given to all
affected persons. 94
Section 23, in conjunction with section 13, requires recognition and
enforcement of foreign country decrees if they are based on laws
which approximate UCCJA standards.95 As with the remainder of
the UCCJA provisions, section 23 is binding unilaterally. That is,
the state adopting section 23 is bound by its terms, regardless of
whether the foreign country has a similar law.
Although the international provision of the UCCJA has reinforced
the U.S. courts' cooperation in international custody disputes, un-
certainty regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign coun-
try custody decrees still exists. The law is unsettled regarding
interpretation of the section 23 requirement for "reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard."- Service of notice provisions of the
UCCJA must be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution96 or else they will be unconstitutional or
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). Hergen stated:
[T]he Passport Office frequently encounters cases where the courts of a foreign
jurisdiction award custody of a child to the abducting parent, despite the fact that
a court in the United States already has made a custody determination. In some
instances, the abducting parent's acquisition of custody occurs by automatic operation
of law in the foreign jurisdiction.
Id. at 44.
Courts in each country generally use their own substantive standards for all phases of
custody adjudication, including jurisdiction, ordering original custody decrees, and modifying
existing decrees. See Gaw, When Uncle Sam Needs to Come to the Rescue, 9 FAm. ADvoc.
24, 25 (1987) [hereinafter Gaw]; Note, American and International Responses to International
Child Abduction, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL., 415, 423 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Responses].
94. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 23; 9 U.L.A. at 326.
95. Compare Com. ex rel Zaubi v. Zaubi, 492 Pa. 183, 423 A.2d 333 (1980) (Pennsylvania
courts compelled to recognize valid custody decrees from foreign nations) with AI-Fassi v. A]-
Fassi, 433 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Bahamian custody decree not recognized
since Bahamian Court did not hold jurisdiction in substantial conformity with UCCJA).
96. U.S. CoNsT. amend. 14, § 1. Section I provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
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unconstitutionally applied. The language of UCCJA section 23 is
troublesome because it varies from the language employed for do-
mestic notice under the UCCJA97 as well as from Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust,98 a U.S. Supreme Court case which enunciates the
standard for meeting due process service of notice requirements. 99 A
California Supreme Court case, Miller v. Superior Court,00 typifies
the problem courts encounter when interpreting international notice
requirements under the UCCJA. In Miller, the California Supreme
Court plurality ruled that an Australian court order awarding tem-
porary custody to the Australian father was enforceable in California
when notice of the Australian court order was served on the mother's
attorney. The Court based its holding on the fact that the original
order was temporary in nature, and found that service on the attorney
met both UCCJA and U.S. constitutional standards. 01 Chief Justice
Bird, dissenting, argued that the Austrialian father's attempts to give
notice of the custody hearing to the American mother were insuffi-
cient to meet the Due Process requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution'0 2 because "It]he only attempt
to notify her of the ... hearing was made by delivering Harry's
affidavit and application for change of custody to ... the attorney
who had represented Patricia ... only one hour and fifty five minutes
before the hearing."'' 0
Although the UCCJA calls for the recognition and enforcement
of foreign country custody decrees, courts hearing international cases
under the UCCJA may find further reasons not to enforce foreign
country judgments due to provisions regarding changed circumstances
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
97. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 5; 9 U.L.A. at 212, provides in part: "(a) Notice required
for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this State shall be given in a manner
reasonably calculated to give actual notice ....." Id.
98. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
99. Id. The Mullane court stated that "when notice is a person's due, process which is a
mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." Id. at 315.
100. Miller v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 923, 587 P.2d 723, 151 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1978).
101. Id. at 928.
102. Id. at 945.
103. Id. at 937; see also Laskosky v. Laskosky, 504 So.2d 726, 731 (Miss. 1987) (American
mother received reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard when notice of Canadian
custody hearing delivered to mother's attorney prior to attorney informing court she no longer
represented mother).
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and the best interests of the child. Although all U.S. jurisdictions
have adopted the UCCJA, many states have variations in the versions
they have enacted. 1' These variations, coupled with vague language
in the original draft, expose the UCCJA to conflicting interpretations
which prevent it from achieving its intended deterrent effect. 10 Con-
sequently, although the UCCJA promoted uniformity of custody
decisions to some extent, it did not succeed in curbing the rise of
parental child abductions.
B. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)
1. Purposes and Objectives
The continued pattern of inconsistent and conflicting decisions
regarding modification of custody decrees and the increasing numbers
of domestic parental child abductions resulted in intervention at the
federal level of government. On December 28, 1980, Congress enacted
the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA),101 federal legislation
which bolsters the UCCJA by requiring all United States jurisdictions
to recognize and enforce sister-state decisions regarding custody and
visitation rights. 1 7 Initial custody decrees issued in compliance with
the terms of the PKPA, now are due full faith and credit by sister
states. 08 Assistance in locating abducting parents is also provided by
allowing access to the Parent Locator Service t' 9 and resources of the
104. UCCJA, supra note 12, at Table of Jurisdictions; 9 U.L.A. at 115.
105. Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 80. For example, in supporting concurrent
jurisdiction provisions in ICARA, David W. Lloyd referred to the conflicting interpretations
of UCCJA Article 23:
We already have a situation where State courts could modify foreign decrees under
Article 23 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Unfortunately, we have
had a lack of uniformity in application of that, and it is our belief that if the
Congress restricts jurisdiction of these cases to State courts there is a grave danger
that the procedures of the Convention will not be uniformly applied, and that would
be no better than where we are with the UCCJA.
Id.
106. PKPA, supra note 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982 & Supp. 1988).
107. Id. According to Clark, "Congress passed the PKPA primarily to implement the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution as it applies to custody decrees." CLARK, LAW
OF Dom.snc R LAnioNs, supra note 23, at 476.
108. PKPA, supra note 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982 & Supp. 1988) provides: "(a) The
appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify
except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made
consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." Id.
109. Id. The Parent Locator Service is established under Section 453 of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1980). Section 453 requires the Parent Locator Service to obtain and
transmit information regarding the whereabouts of a parent obliged to pay child support,
while Section 463 of the Social Security Act authorizes the use of the Parent Locator Service
to find missing parents involved in domestic parental kidnapping cases. Id.
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Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Fugitive Felon Act."0
2. Federalization
In essence, the PKPA "federalizes" certain provisions of the
UCCJA by requiring state courts to apply uniform standards for
exercising modification jurisdiction to existing domestic custody de-
crees."' Although initially there was some confusion concerning the
role of federal courts in deciding custody cases under the PKPA, in
1987, the U.S. Supreme Court apparently resolved the issue in
Thompson v. Thompson."2 The Court found that in enacting the
PKPA, Congress did not intend to create a federal cause of action
for disputes regarding the enforcement of sister-state custody decrees.
Instead, the Court reasoned, Congress intended to set federal stan-
dards which would require the states to afford full faith and credit
to domestic child custody decrees." 3
110. PKPA, supra note 18; 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1982). See generally Comment, The Conflict
Between the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act and the Extradition Act: Naming the Custodial
Parent Both Legal Guardian and Fugitive, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 1047 (1988). According to the
author:
Under the Fugitive Felon Act, when felony arrest warrants have been issued against
interstate kidnapers by state agents upon proof of flight to avoid prosecution, the
F.B.I. is authorized to investigate the interstate kidnapings. The Parent Locator
Service, on the other hand, is administered at the state level with each state operating
a service primarily to enforce child support obligations. States now have the option,
however, to enter into an agreement with the Federal Parent Locator Services of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The federal service
avails requesting state agencies of address information collected from federal agencies
which utilize social security identification numbers. Addresses obtained from this
service are used to track the alleged parental kidnaper. The combined effects of the
Parent Locator Service and the Fugitive Felon Act were intended by Congress to
help discourage noncustodial parental kidnaping by increasing the likelihood that
criminal penalties will be imposed upon interstate violations. Thus, the noncustodial
parent who attempts abduction and flight to another state now risks extradition and
criminal penalties pursuant to federal law.
Id. at 1063-64. See also Comment, Returning United States Children Abducted to Foreign
Countries: The Need to Implement The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, 5 B.U. ITr'L L.J. 119, 131 n.72 (1987) (quoting Comment, Snatching
Legislative Power: The Justice Department's Refusal to Enforce the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act, 73 J. Caim. L. & CRanooOY 1176, 1185 n.3 (1982)).
111. The term "federalizes" refers to the concept caused by the preemption of state laws
in favor of federal laws that are intended to control the area of law. See, e.g., Murphy v.
Woerner, 748 P.2d 749, 750 (Alaska 1988). In Murphy, the Supreme Court of Alaska found
that although both the UCCJA and the PKPA govern child custody disputes, the PKPA
provides a uniform federal standard to ascertain modification jurisdiction in child custody
proceedings. Id. See also Johnson v. Denton, 542 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
The Florida District Court of Appeals affirmed that "where the PKPA and the state's version
of the UCCJA conflict, the PKPA preempts state law." Id.
112. 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
113. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 518-20.
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Like the UCCJA, the PKPA provides for the "best interests of
the child" as one means of obtaining subject matter jurisdiction.1
4
The PKPA does not address the question of whether a custody decree
issued without personal jurisdiction, as required by May v. Ander-
son,"5 is nonetheless entitled to recognition and enforcement. 16 Un-
like the UCCJA, the PKPA contains no provision for enforcement
of foreign country custody decrees. However, the PKPA does not
prohibit international enforcement at the state level," 7 so state codes
which incorporate the international provision into the UCCJA do
not conflict with the terms of the PKPA."8
Although the PKPA is designed to complement the UCCJA, there
are notable differences between the two laws. The first area of
distinction concerns initial jurisdiction. Under section 3 of the UCCJA,
jurisdiction may be found equally under either the "home state"
basis or the "best interest of the child" basis." 9 However, the PKPA,
while recognizing these two bases for jurisdiction, prioritizes them,
favoring the "home state" basis over the "best interest of the child"
basis. '0 Prioritizing serves to restrict the frequency of custody decree
modifications.' 2' Next, the UCCJA allows continuing jurisdiction'2
as long as at least one parent is living in the state and maintains
contact with the child; if both parents have left the state, it will lose
its continuing jurisdiction.'2 The PKPA allows the state to retain
jurisdiction so long as either the child or one parent lives in the
114. PKPA, supra note 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. 1988). UCCJA,
supra note 12, at § 3(a)(2); 9 U.L.A. at 143.
115. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
116. CLARK, LAW OF DoMsc RmATIONS, supra note 23, at 486 & n.80.
117. For a discussion regarding the PKPA ommission of any provision for enforcement of
foreign country custody decrees, see id. at 481. Clark states that: "mhe PKPA, due to its
relationship to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, contains no provision concerning the
enforcement of the custody decrees of foreign countries." Id. (footnote omitted). See also
Note, Responses, supra note 93, at 685. The author states that: "[G]ranting full faith and
credit to a foreign nation custody decree is an extremely controversial action which might
jeopardize passage of the bill." Id.
118. CLARK, LAW OF Doms=Tc RELATiONs, supra note 23, at 481.
119. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 3; 9 U.L.A. at 143.
120. PKPA, supra note 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982 & Supp. 1988). See also CROUCH,
supra note 56, at 91.
121. For a general discussion of the differences in approaches to jurisdiction between the
UCCJA and the PKPA, see CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsnc RE.ATONS, supra note 23, at 478-84.
See also Blakesley, supra note 25, at 352-56.
122. UCCJA, supra note 12, at § 14 comment; 9 U.L.A. at 292. Continuing jurisdiction
refers to the principle whereby the court that issued the original custody decree retains
jurisdiction to modify the decree under local law. Id.
123. Id. at commissioners' note.
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state.'2 Therefore, under the PKPA, the original state may retain
jurisdiction so long as one parent lives there, regardless of whether
he maintains contact with the child. Third, the PKPA has not had
an affirmative impact on international child custody disputes because
it does not address enforcement of foreign country custody decrees.
The absence of such a provision allows each state to determine its
own recognition and enforcement guidelines regarding international
abductions. Consequently, foreign parents faced with international
abductions to the United States will not benefit from a uniform,
national standard for affording full faith and credit to foreign country
custody decrees.
Domestic legislation failed to curb the rise of parental child ab-
ductions within the United States. Parents frustrated with custody
disputes often resorted to self-help measures; the philosophy of "seize
and run" proved effective in an environment in which courts willingly
exercised modification jurisdiction. When domestic legislation failed
to curb the rise of international child abductions, countries were
forced to look to one another for support and assistance.
25
C. Strasbourg Convention
The Strasbourg Convention'2 is an international treaty established
by the European Council. It provides rules for the recognition and
enforcement of custody decrees made by countries who are signatories
to the Convention. 2 7 In the preamble to the Convention, the signa-
tories acknowledge the increased number of cases involving interna-
tional child abductions and "the difficulties of securing adequate
solutions to the problems caused by such cases.' ' 28 Resolution of the
problems and the welfare of the abducted children will be enhanced
124. PKPA, supra note 18; 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982 & Supp. 1988). See also Scoans
& HAY, supra note 54, at 530-31 (when only one parent continues to live in forum state,
PKPA maintains jurisdiction in forum-state rather than transferring jurisdiction to child's
present home state).
125. See Stotter, supra note 63, at 289. For the 10 year period between 1975 and 1985,
the number of reported cases of children abducted from the United States to other countries
grew steadily. While only five cases were reported in 1975, 304 cases were reported in 1985;
by 1985, nearly 2,000 children had been reported abducted from the United States to other
countries. Id.
126. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63.
127. Id. The Strasbourg Convention is a regional convention established by the Council of
Europe. Article 23 provides that non-European countries may accede to the Strasbourg
Convention by invitation. Id. at art. 23. The signatories to the Strasbourg Convention are
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, England, France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Liechten-
stein, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland. See CROUCH, supra note 56, at 97.
128. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63, at preamble.
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by establishing "legal co-operation" between the signatories. 129
General provisions of the Strasbourg Convention resemble those
of the Hague Convention.130 The Strasbourg Convention applies to
children under 16 years of age,' and covers rights of access'32 as
well as wrongful removals. 33 Central Authorities cooperate with each
other in order to execute the purposes of the treaty, 3 4 and perform
specified duties to assist in locating abducted children and return
them once enforcement is granted. 3 Finally, although the Strasbourg
Convention is designed to enforce existing custody decrees, under a
very narrow set of circumstances, it also can obligate a country to
return a child who was abducted prior to the issuance of a custody
decree. In that event, the parent may obtain a custody decision from
the child's home state after the abduction has occurred in order to
invoke the Strasbourg Convention for return of the child.'36
129. See Comment, The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Ab-
duction: The Need for Ratification, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. Ra. 463, 477-78 (1985). The
Strasbourg Convention gives deference to the role of the Central Authorities and permits
discretion of the presiding judges over mandatory return of a wrongfully removed child.
"mhe Council believed that discretion would not be abused, because the requesting state's
courts could retaliate by keeping a child in its jurisdiction contrary to the abusing court's
custody order." Id. at 478.
130. Overlapping members of both the Hague Convention and the Strasbourg Convention
were able to share suggestions and ideas for both treaties. The Hague Convention sought to
design a return agreement which would be simpler to implement and more accessible to
additional members. Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at 100-03.
131. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63, at art. l(a).
132. Id. at art. 11. "Decisions on rights of access and provisions of decisions relating to
custody which deal with the right of access shall be recognized and enforced subject to the
same conditions as other decisions relating to custody." Id. at art. 11(1).
133. Id. at art. 4.
134. Id. at art. 3(l). The Central Authorities transmit requests for information regarding
proceedings under the Convention, provide information about the custody law of their respective
States, and keep each other informed of any problems encountered in carrying out the
Convention. Id. at art. 3(2).
135. Id. at art. 5. The Central Authorities must take appropriate action, including the
initiation of judicial proceedings, to discover the child's whereabouts; to avoid prejudice to
the child or applicants; to secure recognition or enforcement of the decision; to secure return
of the child when enforcement is granted; and to inform the requesting party of progress
made on the applicant's behalf. Id. at art. 5(1).
136. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63, at art. 12. Article 12 provides:
Where, at the time of the removal of a child across an international frontier, there
is no enforceable decisioni given in a Contracting State relating to his custody, the
provisions of this Convention shall apply to any subsequent decision, relating to the
custody of that child and declaring the removal to be unlawful, given in a Contracting
State at the request of any interested person.
Id.
However, pursuant to Article 18 of the Convention, a Contracting State may make a
reservation to not be bound by the provisions of Article 12. In such an event, "[t]he decisions
of this Convention shall not apply to decisions referred to in Article 12 which have been given
in a Contracting State which has made such a reservation." Id. at art. 18.
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1. Enforcement Provisions and Exceptions
The Strasbourg Convention is a complex document which contains
many loopholes in the requirement for recognition and enforcement
of foreign custody decrees. 137 While Article 7 provides the basic rule
that "[a] decision relating to custody given in a Contracting State
shall be recognized and, where it is enforceable in the State of origin,
made enforceable in every other Contracting State,' 1 38 Articles 8
through 10 specify various grounds for refusing to recognize and
enforce otherwise valid foreign custody decrees. Under Article 8,
three conditions must be met before the requested country is required
to return an improperly removed 139 child: 1) the sole nationality of
the child and both her parents must be of the country which made
the earlier custody determination; 2) the child must have been ha-
bitually residing in that country; and 3) the request for custody
restoration must be made to a Central Authority within six months
of the wrongful taking. 4 If these conditions are met, none of the
exceptions will apply and the child must be returned. 14' If the
requirement of nationality is not met, the child's return is not
mandatory and exceptions under Articles 9 and 10 may become
applicable, depending upon the particular circumstances of the case. 42
Article 9 provides three basic exceptions to recognition and enforce-
ment of custody decrees. The first exception relates to notice. Unless
the abducting parent has purposely concealed his whereabouts, he
will not be bound by the foreign decree if he "was not duly served"
137. For informative discussions on the Strasbourg Convention, see Jones, Council of
Europe Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Relating to the Custody of
Children, 30 INT'L & Con,. L.Q. 467 (1981); and Ekelaar, International Child Abduction by
Parents, 32 U. ToRorro L.J. 281 (1982) [hereinafter Ekelaar].
138. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63, at art. 7.
139. Id. at art. 1(d). "Improper removal" is defined as:
the removal of a child across an international frontier in breach of a decision relating
to his custody which has been given in a Contracting State and which is enforceable
in such a State; improper removal also includes:
(i) the failure to return a child across an international frontier at the end of a
period of the exercise of the right of access to this child or at the end of any other
temporary stay in a territory other than that where the custody is exercised;
(ii) a removal which is subsequently declared unlawful within the meaning of
Article 12.
Id.
140. Id. at art. 8.
141. Id. at art. 8(2).
142. Ekelaar, supra note 137, at 323. If the nationality requirement is not met, but the six
month time limitation is, Article 9 exceptions apply; in all other cases, the broad exceptions
of Article 10 apply. Id.
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with notice of the proceeding in reasonable time to prepare a de-
fense. 143 Next, the contracting state may refuse to recognize and
enforce a foreign custody decree if the decision was made in the
absence of the defendant parent and jurisdiction was not based on:
a) the defendant's habitual residence; b) the habitual residence of
both parents, with one parent being still habitually resident; or c)
the child's habitual residence. The third exception contained in Article
9 specifies that unless the child had habitually resided in the request-
ing state for at least one year prior to the child's abduction, the
requested state may refuse to return the child if the "decision is
incompatible with a decision relating to custody which became en-
forceable in the State addressed before the removal of the child."
144
Article 10 exceptions can be used in addition to those contained
in Article 9.145 Under Article 10, recognition and enforcement may
be refused if "the effects of the decision are manifestly incompatible
with the fundamental principles of the law relating to the family and
children in the State addressed" 146 or if new circumstances warrant
refusal in the best interests of the child.147 The requested state also
may refuse to return the child if at the time the proceedings are
initiated, the child has stronger connections with the requested state
than with the requesting state. 148 If the custody decision is incom-
143. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63, at art. 9(1)(a).
144. Id. at art. 9. Article 9 provides that recognition and enforcement may be withheld if:
(a) in the case of a decision given in the absence of the defendant or his legal
representative, the defendant was not duly served with the document which instituted
the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange
his defence; but such a failure to effect service cannot constitute a ground for
refusing recognition or enforcement where service was not effected because the
defendant had concealed his whereabouts from the person who instituted the pro-
ceedings in the State of origin;
(b) in the case of a decision given in the absence of the defendant or his legal
representative, the competence of the authority giving the decision was not founded:
(i) on the habitual residence of the defendant, or
(ii) on the last common habitual residence of the child's parents, at least one parent
being still habitually resident there, or
(iii) on the habitual residence of the child;
(c) the decision is incompatible with a decision relating to custody which becomes
enforceable in the State addressed before the removal of the child, unless the child
has had his habitual residence in the territory of the requesting State for one year
before his removal.
Id.
145. Id. at art. 10(1).
146. Id. at art. 10(1)(a).
147. Id. at art. 10(b). See also Bainham, The Practitioner: Family Law Notes, 138 NEw
L.J. 336 (1988) (discussion of English case declining to return two children under Article 10(b)
because they spent nearly two years in England before father sought to enforce French custody
order, despite fact that mother wrongfully removed children to England).
148. Strasbourg Convention, supra note 63, at art. 10(l)(c).
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patible with a prior decision enforceable in the requesting country,
and declining to enforce the decision would promote the child's
welfare, the return of the child can also be refused.
149
Finally, proceedings under the Strasbourg Convention may be
adjourned on any of the following conditions: 1) an ordinary review
of the original custody decree has been initiated; 2) custody proceed-
ings initiated prior to those commenced by the requesting country
are pending in the requested country; or 3) another decision regarding
custody of the child and enforcement of the original custody decree
is pending. 150
The number and intricacy of exceptions in the Strasbourg Conven-
tion, as well as reliance on the principle of nationality, inhibit the
Convention's effectiveness. If the child and both parents are nationals
of the country from which the child was abducted, the child must
be returned, presumably without consideration of the child's best
interests. However, if the nationality principle is not met, ever-
broadening exceptions may be triggered. The six-month time limit
for submission of the application places an undue burden on the
applicant and induces the defendant to hide the child. Finally, Article
17 allows a contracting country to include the broad exceptions of
Article 10 in any provisions which allow for Article 9 exceptions.
51
Given the nationality requirement and the potential for widespread
use of Article 10 exceptions, a contracting country may lose any
meaningful protections offered under the Strasbourg Convention.
Finally, the Convention is limited in membership, so its effects will
not be far-reaching. 152
IV. HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION AND THE UNITED STATES IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION, THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES ACT
A. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction
1. Introduction
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (Hague Convention or Convention) is a multinational
149. Id. at art. 10(l)(d).
150. Id. at art. 10(2).
151. Id. at art. 17.
152. The United States is not a member and has not been invited to join.
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treaty designed to establish uniform rules regarding cases of inter-
national child abduction. In 1976, the issue of international child
abductions resulting from marital breakups was introduced during a
planning meeting of the Thirteenth Session of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law. 53 The Conference established a com-
mittee (Special Committee) empowered to research and prepare a
draft Convention to alleviate the problem of international parental
child abductions. An extensive report prepared for the Special
Committee 154 identified the following sociological factors which have
accelerated both the volume and frequency of international child
abductions: improvements in international transportation; greater
freedom and ability to cross borders; increased numbers of marriages
between persons from different countries; and a general liberalization
in the granting and recognition of divorces.: 5 After completing its
investigation, the Special Commission drafted the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions, which was
unanimously adopted 56 on October 24, 1980 at the Fourteenth Session
of the Hague Conference.
57
2. Objectives
The specific objectives of the Hague Convention are two-fold: to
secure the prompt return of wrongfully removed or retained 58 chil-
153. Stotter, supra note 63, at 291. The Peace Palace at The Hague, Netherlands, is home
to the Hague Academy of International Law. The Academy hosts various international
conferences, including the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The Hague
Conference on Private International Law is a multinational organization established by treaty
to unify rules for various areas of private international law. The First Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law was held in 1893. The Conference convenes at the
Peace Palace once every four years. Since the mid-1950s, the Conference has prepared more
than 24 conventions, including the Hague Convention on International Child Abductions. Droz
& Dyer, supra note 62, at 157-59.
154. Stotter, supra note 63, at 291. See also Hague Conference, Legal Kidnapping,
Questionnaire and Report on International Child Abduction by One Parent, PREUIM. Doc.
No. 1 (1978) [hereinafter Dyer Report]. This report was prepared by Mr. Adair Dyer, First
Secretary of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Convention. Id.
155. Stotter, supra note 63, at 291-92.
156. Id. at 291.
157. The official history and commentary of the Convention was prepared by Elisa Perez-
Vera. The report is contained in Actes et documents de la Quatorzieme Session, 3 CHILD
ABDUCTION (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conf. on Private Int'l Law ed. 1980). The report
may be ordered from: Netherlands Government Printing & Publishing Office, 1 Christoffel
Plantijnstraat, Post-Box 20014, 2500 EA The Hague, Netherlands. See Legal Analysis of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503-
04 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis].
158. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,503. "Wrongful removal" is the taking of a
child from the person who actually exercised custody, while "wrongful retention" is the
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dren to the country of their habitual residence, and to ensure that
visitation rights are respected between the Contracting States. 59 The
Hague Convention is a novel and unique approach to the problem
of parental child abductions because it does not require the enforce-
ment of existing custody decrees; instead, it allows a court to deter-
mine whether to order a child returned irrespective of the existence
of a custody decree. The Convention is designed to compel the
abducting parent to return the child voluntarily. 60 If the parent
refuses, the Convention provides procedures for effecting the child's
return under court order.' 6' In recommending Senate approval for
ratification of the Convention, United States President, Ronald
Reagan, summarized the aims of the Convention with the following
words:
The Convention's approach to the problem of international child
abduction is a simple one. The Convention is designed promptly to
restore the factual situation that existed prior to a child's removal
or retention. It does not seek to settle disputes about legal custody
rights, nor does it depend upon the existence of court orders as a
condition for returning children. The international abductor is de-
nied legal advantage from the abduction to or retention in the
country where the child is located, as resort to the Convention is
to effect the child's swift return to his or her circumstances before
the abduction or retention. In most cases this will mean return to
the country of the child's habitual residence where any dispute
about custody rights can be heard and settled. 62
Inherent in the philosophy of the Convention is the notion that strict
application of the Convention provisions is necessary to deter future
abductions. 1
63
keeping of a child without the consent of the custodial person. Wrongful retention does not
include the situation in which the custodial person denies the non-custodial person his visitation
rights. The law in the state of the child's habitual residence determines whether the removal
or retention is wrongful. Id.
159. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. l(b); 19 I.L.M. at 1501. See also Legal
Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,498-505.
160. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 7; 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
161. Id.
162. See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), reprinted
in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,495 (1986) [hereinafter Transmittal Letter]. The Convention is
private civil law, not criminal law, so abduction is wrongful in a civil, not a criminal sense.
Unlike the UCCJA, the Hague Convention does not seek to extradite the wrongdoer, although
the Convention does not bar independent criminal action from being taken. Legal Analysis,
supra note 157, at 10,505.
163. As stated by Secretary of State, George Schultz:
If the Convention machinery succeeds in rapidly restoring children to their pre-
abduction or pre-retention circumstances, it will have the desirable effect of deterring
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3. The Hague Decision to not Address Custody Jurisdiction
The drafters of the Hague Convention failed to reach a consensus
regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody judg-
ments: while some countries felt that the courts should retain broad
discretion to review foreign custody decisions in order to promote
the interests of the given child, others believed that full recognition
and enforcement of foreign custody judgments was necessary to deter
parental kidnapping. 64 The United States joined this second group.161
As a compromise measure between these two divergent viewpoints,
the Hague Convention does not address recognition and enforcement
of foreign custody decrees. Instead, it mandates the prompt return
of an abducted child to her country of origin, subject to specified
exceptions provided by the Convention, regardless of any existing or
pending custody decrees. In other words, a decision to return the
child must be made in accordance with Convention guidelines and
may not be based on the merits of the underlying custody dispute. 66
Once the child is returned home, the appropriate judicial body in
her home state generally will determine custody on the merits of the
case. 1
67
A potential problem exists regarding the effect the Hague Conven-
tion will have on the UCCJA. The Convention itself does not replace
or exclude other U.S. legislation, such as UCCJA, which afford
remedies in child custody cases.168 Article 34 states in part: "[T]he
... Convention shall not restrict the application of ... the law of
the State addressed for the purposes of obtaining the return of a
child who has been wrongfully removed or retained or of organizing
access rights."1 69 Under this provision, a foreign applicant holding a
parental kidnapping, as the legal and other incentives for wrongful removal or
retention will have been eliminated. Indeed, while it is hoped that the convention
will be effective in returning the child in individual cases, the full extent of its
success may never b[e] quantifiable as an untold number of potential parental
kidnappings may have been deterred.
Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494,
10,496 (1986).
164. Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at 102.
165. Id.
166. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 19; 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
167. Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at 102-03.
168. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 34; 19 I.L.M. at 1504.
169. See Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at 112-13. Professor
Bodenheimer feared that a foreign applicant will have a more difficult time retrieving a child
from the United States given the return restrictions in the Convention. Professor Bodenheimer
reasoned that "[t]he Convention's time limits and exceptions would become part of the state
law; in other words, the restrictions would be read into the international provision of the
UCCJA." Id. at 113.
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valid custody decree who seeks the return of a child abducted to the
United States may invoke either or both the UCCJA and the Hague
Convention. The aggrieved parent may prefer to invoke the UCCJA
because it mandates recognition and efiforcement of foreign custody
decrees. 70 In that way, the parent would regain actual custody of
her child by having her legal custody recognized and enforced. Under
the Hague Convention, however, the parent would be asserting only
her right to actual custody, not legal custody rights granted under
the decree. She would run the risk of the respondent asserting one
of the exceptions, not available under the UCCJA, in order to avoid
returning the child. If the respondent prevailed, the child would
remain in the United States where the state court might be able to
assert jurisdiction to relitigate, and possibly modify, the foreign-
country decree. If the applicant parent does not hold an enforceable
custody decree, the Convention is, of course, superior to the UCCJA
or PKPA in obtaining the immediate return of the child.171
4. Scope of Coverage
The Convention is binding when the country of the child's habitual
residence and the country to which the child has been abducted
legally have enacted the Hague Convention. 72 To date, eleven coun-
tries have enacted the Convention as law. 73 If the child is abducted
only to a different location within the original contracting state, the
Convention will not apply. For example, if a child is abducted from
one U.S. state to another, the Convention will not apply because the
child has remained within the United States; thus, the complaining
parent must seek recourse through domestic channels, such as the
UCCJA or the PKPA. 174
170. Id. at 111.
171. Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz (Oct. 4, 1985), reprinted in 51 Fed. Reg.
10,494, 10,496 (1986). "The Convention will be especially advantageous in pre-decree abduction
cases where no court order exists that may be enforced under the UCCJA." Id.
172. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 38; 19 I.L.M. at 1504. See also Legal
Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,501 (other countries may accede to the Convention).
173. The Contracting States which have legally enacted the Convention are: Australia,
Austria, Canada, France, Hungary, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. President Signs Law Implementing International Child
Abduction Treaty, 7 A.B.A. Juv. & CHID WvELFAR, L. RaP. 62 (1988). Other countries which
are expected to become parties to the Convention within the next few years include the Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988,
supra note 3 (written testimony of Peter H. Pfund).
174. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 4; 19 I.L.M. at 1501. See also Legal Analysis,
supra note 157, at 10,504 (specifying applicable custody laws regarding domestic and inter-
national abductions).
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The Convention does not apply to all children who have been
wrongfully removed from their homes across international bounda-
ries. Children must meet five requirements in order to be protected
under the Convention. First, the child must have been wrongfully
removed or retained. 75 Second, the child must have resided habitually
in a Contracting State immediately prior to being abducted to another
Contracting State. 176 Third, the child must not have attained sixteen
years of age when the wrongful removal or retention took place. In
fact, even if the child was not yet sixteen when she was abducted,
the Convention ceases to apply once she turns sixteen.177 Fourth, the
wrongful taking or retention must have occurred after both Con-
tracting States involved in the incident have legally implemented the
Convention. 78 Finally, another time limitation can block the auto-
matic return of a child who meets the four previous qualifications.
Under Article 12, the court hearing the case is required to order
the return of the child only if the judicial proceedings have been
commenced within a year from the taking of the child. 179 In the
event that more than one year has passed between the date of the
abduction and the date on which the legal proceedings are com-
menced, the court has discretion to deny the child's return if the
respondent demonstrates that the child has become settled in her new
home. If the abductor hides the child so that the applicant does not
know the child's location, the applicant cannot "initiate proceed-
ings." Therefore, the applicant cannot meet the one year deadline
for commencing proceedings, and the abductor will have gained an
advantage by demonstrating that the child had become settled. Al-
though it is likely that the court would seriously question whether
the abductor should be able to retain the child, the court is not
mandated by the Convention to order the child's return under these
175. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 3; 19 I.L.M. at 1501. See also Legal Analysis,
supra note 157, at 10,503 (definition of "wrongful removal").
176. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 4; 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
177. Id. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,504 (age requirements for Convention
coverage).
178. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 35; 19 I.L.M. It 1504. See also Legal
Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,504. This provision is subject to multiple interpretations.
Narrowly defined, if the wrongful act occurred before the Convention took effect in the
Contracting State, that State would not be bound. Under a broad interpretation, that State
would be bound if the wrongful taking was still unresolved after the State effectuated the
Convention. Id.
179. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 12; 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
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circumstances. 80 If courts abuse their discretion by frequently or
routinely allowing the abducting parent to retain physical custody of
the child, they will undermine the goals of the Convention and
promote, rather than deter, future parental child abductions.' 8 '
5. Procedures for Invoking the Convention
The person whose custody rights have been breached 82 and who
is seeking the return of the child, holds the right to invoke the Hague
Convention by filing a petition8 3 with any Central Authority. 8 4 From
180. Id. As stated in the Legal Analysis:
If the alleged wrongdoer concealed the child's whereabouts from the custodian
necessitating a long search for the child and thereby delayed the commencement of
a return proceeding by the applicant, it is highly questionable whether the respondent
should be permitted to benefit from such conduct absent strong countervailing
considerations.
Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509.
181. At the time of publication, overall statistics regarding reported cases of child abductions
to the United States Department of State were not available. State Department personnel did
advise that from July, 1988 through mid-September, 1989, 49 applications on behalf of United
States citizens were submitted to the Hague Convention. Fifteen resulted in the child's return,
either voluntarily or through the courts. For the same time period, the United States received
61 applications on behalf of parents outside the United States. Of those, 13 children were
returned to the applicable member country, again, either voluntarily or through the courts.
Telephone interview with Keith Jordan, Intern, United States Department of State (Sept. 20,
1989).
182. Custody rights under the Hague Convention include those derived by operation of
law, from a judicial or administrative decision, or by an agreement having legal effect under
the State law. The determination of whether a removal or retention is wrongful under the
Convention is made in reference to the law of the child's habitual residence. A parent who
holds custody rights which arise by operation of law in the country of habitual residence does
not need a court order granting custody. See Hague Convention, supra note 7, at arts. 3, 15;
19 I.L.M. at 1501, 1503. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,506.
For example, in the United States, both parents share equal custody rights prior to the
issuance of a court order. If one parent removes or retains a child without the permission of
the other parent, the removing parent has acted wrongfully under the Hague Convention. See
id. at 10,506. Likewise, if a child who was living in another Contracting State is brought to
or retained in the United States, the determination of wrongfulness is resolved by looking to
the law of the Contracting State in which the child had been living. Id.
183. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8; 19 I.L.M. at 1502. The application must
specify the identity of the applicant, the child, and the alleged abductor; the child's date of
birth, if available; the grounds on which the claim is based; and any information as to the
whereabouts of the child. The application may also contain other relevant information
including, but not limited to, an authenticated copy of a custody decree or a valid affidavit
as to the child's habitual residence. Id.
184. Id. The Convention requires each Contracting State to designate an administrative
agency which will serve as a Central Authority (CA) to implement the Convention mandates
within the State. Each CA is free to implement the Convention in conformance with the legal
system of its Contracting State, thus allowing for some diversity in implementation procedures.
Id. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,511. Article 6 of the Hague Convention
requires the CAs to exercise powers and duties enumerated in Article 7 (cooperate to effectuate
prompt return of the child); Article 9 (transfer applications to the appropriate Contracting
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the plain language of the Convention, it appears that the Convention
cannot be invoked defensively, that is, by the abductor.'85 This
distinction is important under circumstances in which the applicant
holds a foreign-country custody decree recognizable and enforceable
in the United States. In that event, if the applicant invokes only the
UCCJA for enforcement of the custody decree, the issue then be-
comes whether the abducting parent will be bound to argue her case
under the UCCJA or whether she also is able to assert the Hague
Convention, specifically its exceptions, as a defense to returning the
child.
18 6
In order to expedite processing under the Convention, the applicant
should file the petition with the Central Authority of the country to
which the child has been abducted, since it is the court in that
country which will decide whether the child should be returned. 187
Although the complaining party is not required to have a custody
State); Article 10 (take all appropriate measures to obtain the voluntary return of the child);
Article 11 (expedite prompt and efficient judicial and administrative proceedings); Article 15
(supply, upon request, evidence that the removal was wrongful); Article 21 (process applications
for right of access in the same manner as applications for return of the child); Article 26
(bear certain administrative costs); Article 27 (decline acceptance of unfounded applications);
and Article 28 (require-at its discretion-written authorization empowering it to act for the
applicant). Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6; 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
185. Article 8 states: "Any person, institution or other body claiming that a child has been
removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to the Central Authority of
the child's habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for
assistance in securing the return of the child." Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 8; 19
I.L.M. at 1502.
The Legal Analysis II(B)(l) entitled Holders of Rights Protected by the Convention, provides:
[I]t is up to the "person, institution or other body" . . . who "actually exercised"
custody of the child prior to the abduction, or who would have exercised custody
but for the abduction, to invoke the Convention to secure the child's return. Article
3(a-b). It is this person who holds the rights protected by the Convention and who
has the right to seek relief pursuant to its terms.
Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,505.
186. See Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,507-08 which states:
Under Article 29 a person is not precluded from seeking judicially-ordered return
of a child pursuant to laws and procedures other than the Convention .... Accord-
ingly, a parent seeking return of a child from the United States could petition for
return pursuant to the Convention, or in the alternative or additionally, for enforce-
ment of a foreign court order pursuant to the UCCJA. For instance, an English
father could petition courts in New York either for return of his child under the
Convention and/or for recognition and enforcement of his British custody decree
pursuait to the UCCJA. If he prevailed in either situation, the respective court
could order the child returned to him in England. The father in this illustration may
find the UCCJA remedy swifter than invoking the Convention for the child's return
because it is not subject to the exceptions set forth in the Convention.
Id.
187. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11; 19 I.L.M. at 1502. See also Legal
Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,503 (country to which child has been brought undertakes
judicial or administrative proceeding for his return).
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decree to invoke the Convention, the court may require that the
applicant provide proof that the taking of the child is considered
wrongful in the child's home country.18 Recognizing that the act of
obtaining an actual custody decree might be prohibitively time-
consuming, the Convention allows for verification of a wrongful
taking to be established in some form other than a decree, for
example, by taking judicial notice of the home country law. 18 9 A
custody decree or other legal document which makes no mention of
the Convention or of "wrongful taking" within the meaning of
Article 3, however, may not satisfy the requirement of substantiating
a wrongful taking.' 90 Therefore, a document with sufficient legal
effect to verify that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention will be helpful in
expediting the Convention's return procedures.
The pleading requirements for invoking the Convention are con-
tained in Articles 8 and 24. Under Article 24, the applicant must
submit any applications, communications or other documents to the
Central Authority of the requested country in the applicant's original
language as well as in an official language of the requested country
unless it is not feasible to obtain a translation. In that case, a
translation into either French or English will suffice. 191 The applica-
tion must contain information regarding the identity of the child,
the petitioner and the respondent, the birthdate of the child, and the
grounds for return, including the source of custody rights. 192 The
application also may contain information regarding the circumstances
of the wrongful act, the suspected whereabouts of the child, and any
custody agreements or relevant points of law adhered to in the
applicant's country. 193 The applicant also may request an order for
188. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 15; 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
189. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509.
190. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 15; 19 I.L.M. at 1503. Article 15 does not
specify who may render a document showing the taking was wrongful. Therefore, the document
may be obtained from a court or government agency, e.g., the State Attorney General. If the
law of the child's habitual residence does not allow for this procedure, the applicant will not
be required to obtain such proof. Also, this requirement is to be used sparingly, since the
purpose of the Convention is to restore the child to its factual status quo without considering
the merits of the custody dispute itself. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,508-09.
191. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 24; 19 I.L.M. at 1503. A Contracting State
may make a reservation to prohibit the use of either English or French, but not both, in any
documents sent to its Central Authority. Id. at art. 42; 19 I.L.M. at 1505.
192. Id. at art. 8; 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
193. Evidentiary documents accompanying the application are admissible in the requested
State's courts or administrative bodies empowered to consider the application. Under Article
23, documents do not need to be authenticated unless specifically required by the court. Id.
at art. 23; 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
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payment by the respondent for all fees and expenses incurred in the
process. 94
The court of the requested Contracting State is required to reach
a decision regarding the return of the child within six weeks from
the date upon which it received notice of the child's presence within
its borders. 95 If the court does not make a determination within six
weeks, it will be required, upon request of the applicant or either
Central Authority, to explain why the deadline has not been met. 96
6. Exceptions to Returning the Child
In addition to the timing requirements which must be met for
invocation of the Hague Convention,197 there are four exceptions to
the general rule that a child who has been wrongfully removed shall
be returned to her habitual residence.198 Taken as a whole, the
exceptions reflect an attempt to balance the wariness of the signatories
to relinquish autonomy against their commitment to deter parental
child abductions on an international level. In designing the exceptions,
the Convention drafters faced the difficult problem of how to serve
the interests of an individual child while promoting the broad policy
of the treaty. They chose to recognize the necessity for exceptions
to promote the best interests of a given child, provide for workable
exceptions, and encourage only their limited use.' 99 Their solution
serves the dual purpose of promoting the interests of any given child
while enabling the signatories to maintain a workable, effective
compromise.
These exceptions comprise the most controversial part of the treaty,
since liberal use of them could undermine the philosophy and ef-
fectiveness of the Convention.200 Although the Contracting States are
194. Id. at art. 26; 19 I.L.M. at 1503-04. The court has discretion to charge the respondent
for costs incurred by or for the petitioner, including travel expenses, payments made to locate
and return the child, and legal fees. Id.
195. Id. at art. 11; 19 I.L.M. at 1502. Notice is not limited to receipt of a petition
forwarded by the requesting country. Communication regarding the child's whereabouts may
come from a court, an attorney, another Contracting State, or from the applicant himself.
Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509.
196. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509.
197. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 11; 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
198. Id. at arts. 13, 20; 19 I.L.M. at 1502-03.
199. Id. at art. 13; 19 I.L.M. at 1502-03; Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509.
200. Bodenheimer, International Child Abduction, supra note 2, at 110. Professor Bod-
enheimer expressed concern that the exceptions for return outlined in the Draft Convention
could undermine the objectives of the Convention:
[Tihe exceptions of Article 12 [Article 13 in the final Convention] ... make excessive
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bound to "take all appropriate measures to secure within their
territories the implementation of the objects of the Convention,' 20'
their courts have broad discretion whether or not to utilize the
exceptions. Even though one or more of the exceptions might be
met, the court may still require the child's return. Under all four
exceptions, the respondent has the burden of proving that the excep-
tion has been met.2
a. No Custodial Rights Exception
If the applicant was not actually exercising physical custody2 3 of
the child at the time of the removal, the court may deny the return
of the child.204 In other words, if the respondent can show that the
inroads into the "prompt return" principle. The compromise of giving the judge
some residual discretion to deny the child's return under exceptional circumstances
may be acceptable. But the additional exceptions are so broad that they are apt to
turn what are to be summary proceedings into adversary hearings on the merits,
contrary to the purposes of the Convention.
For example, the court may permit the abductor to retain the child if the child
objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which
it is appropriate to take his or her views into account. Children's preferences are,
of course, considered in hearings on the merits of the custody question. The return
proceedings are not hearings on the merits. The exception places an inordinate
burden of responsibility on children perhaps as young as six or seven years of age.
It does so at a time when the children are fully dependent upon the person who
abducted them and cannot help being influenced, if not pressured, by that person
and perhaps other relatives. Permitting a child to block the return will make the
child the ultimate judge of the abduction's success or failure.
It is hoped that this exception will be eliminated and that the other exceptions will
be sufficiently narrowed to preserve the objectives of the Convention.
Id. Cf. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509 which provides:
[lit was generally believed that the courts would understand and fulfill the objectives
of the Convention by narrowly interpreting the exceptions and allowing their use
only in clearly meritorious cases, and only when the person opposing return had
met the burden of proof .... The courts retain the discretion to order the child
returned even if they consider that one or more of the exceptions applies. Finally,
the wording of each exception represents a compromise to accomodate the different
legal systems and tenets of family law in effect in the countries negotiating the
Convention, the basic purpose in each case being to provide for an exception that
is narrowly construed.
Id.
201. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 2; 19 I.L.M. at 1501.
202. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509.
203. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
204. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 13; 19 I.L.M. at 1502. Article 13 states that
the party opposing the return may establish that: "the person, institution or other body having
the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time
of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or
retention...." Id.
Under Article 8 of the Hague Convention, the complaining party must allege that he or she
actually exercised custody rights and that those rights were breached. The Convention presumes
the person who held custody rights actually exercised them; the abductor has the burden of
proof to disprove this presumption if he wishes to prevent the return of the child. Id. at art.
8; 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
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applicant agreed to the respondent's custody of the child prior to
the removal, or acquiesced to such custody subsequent to the removal,
the removal would not be considered wrongful. On the other hand,
the applicant does not need to prove that he holds a valid custody
decree, as the Convention proceedings are not based on the merits
of the underlying legal custody rights. Instead, the applicant need
only attach supporting material to his application, explaining the
circumstances of actual custody and of the taking. 25 If the abductor
does not return the child voluntarily and a court must make a judicial
determination, the court may request extrinsic proof that the taking
was considered wrongful within the law of the pre-abduction home
country.3
b. Grave Risk of Harm Exception
Another exception occurs if the respondent parent can show that
"there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child
to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation. ' 20 7 The drafters of the Convention were partic-
ularly sensitive to the abuse which could result from overuse of this
exception.208 The risk to the child must be "grave," not merely
serious; and the term "intolerable situation" refers to circumstances
such as physical or sexual abuse rather than merely a less advanta-
geous living situation.3 This exception is not intended as a means
by which the respondent can litigate the child's best interests under
the guise of potential harm. 210
205. Id. The application shall contain "the grounds on which the applicant's claim for
return of the child is based ...." Id. A statement to the effect that the applicant was
exercising actual custody by taking physical care of the child would be sufficient to meet
Article 8(c) requirements. See Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,507.
206. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 15; 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
207. Id. at art. 13(b); 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
208. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,509-10.
209. Id. at 10,510.
210. Id. The Legal Analysis of the "grave risk of harm" exception under Article 13(b)
specifies:
This provision was not intended to be used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate (or
relitigate) the child's best interests. Only evidence directly establishing the existence
of a grave risk that would expose the child to physical or emotional harm or
otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation is material to the court's
determination. The person opposing the child's return must show that the risk to
the child is grave, not merely serious.
Id.
626
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c. The Child's Preference Exception
The court also may refuse to return a child if a child of sufficient
age and maturity prefers to remain with the abducting parent. 21'
Several arguments against the broad application of this exception
have been offered: without determining the underlying merits regard-
ing legal custody, the court must decide whether the child is suffi-
ciently mature to choose in which location to live; an immature child
could very well be unduly influenced by the abducting parent. Also,
if the exception is construed too liberally, the child rather than the
judge will effectively make a return determination under the Con-
vention. These arguments leave several unanswered questions: Should
a child who is sufficiently mature and not unduly influenced, and
who prefers to live in the location which provides better educational
opportunities and a more stable or affluent economic environment,
be allowed to have her preference enforced? How much weight, if
any, should a judge give to the child's emotional, materialistic or
educational preferences? At what point should the child's preference
take precedence over that of the judge-and of the aggrieved par-
ent?212
d. Public Policy Exception
The court may also deny return of the child on grounds of public
policy. 213 If the first three exceptions are vulnerable to misuse and
211. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 13; 19 I.L.M. at 1502-03. The provision for
the age-related exception states: "The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to
order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained
an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views." Id.
If the court believes the child has Jbeen unduly influenced by the abducting parent, it may
give little or no weight to the child's preference in deciding whether the child should be
returned to the home country. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,510.
212. See Blakesley, supra note 25, at 373-81. Blakesley states that:
[w]hile all agree that child-snatching is generally harmful to children and ought to
be discouraged, commentators and legislation have essentially failed to recognize
that, on a given occasion, a child may actually benefit. Hence, the dilemma: do we
promote a policy that is best for children in general, even though enforcement in
individual cases may be harmful?
Id. at 374.
213. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,500. This public policy exception is intended to
be used very sparingly, certainly not more often than the court would apply it in internal/
domestic cases. Id. at 10,510-11 (citing Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child
Abduction, 30 INT'L & Comn,. L.Q. 537, 551-52 (1981)). The public policy exception states:
"The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not
be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 20; 19
I.L.M. at 1503.
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inconsistent application, the public policy exception would seem only
to aggravate the issue. It is therefore generally recognized that the
application of the public policy exception must be carefully restricted.
Two limiting factors are suggested in interpreting the public policy
exception: 1) return of the child must violate an actual law of the
requested country rather than merely be incompatible with the coun-
try's policies or culture, and 2) a country should not invoke the
public policy exception in applying the Convention any more fre-
quently than it does in its own domestic judicial decisions. 214 These
limitations to the public policy exception were added as a compromise
measure, and enabled the exception to be adopted by a margin of
one vote. 215
7. Central Authorities
The Hague Convention requires that each Contracting State estab-
lish a Central Authority (CA) to assist applicants in securing the
return of their children.21 6 In the words of James G. Hergen, Assistant
Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser,
U.S. Department of State, 217 "at the heart of the Convention lies
the requirement that each contracting state establish one or more
official 'Central Authorities' which would serve as clearing houses
for incoming and outgoing applications and which would be well
equipped to provide organized, authoritative information and assis-
tance. "218 Each CA is required to take appropriate steps "to secure
the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable
resolution of the issues. ' 21 9 Pursuant to Article 7, the CA must "take
all appropriate measures" to find the child, protect the child from
harm, exchange social background information regarding the child
when appropriate, provide general legal information on the law of
their State, initiate judicial proceedings, facilitate or provide legal
aid when appropriate, provide administrative arrangements for the
safe return of the child, and maintain contact with other Central
214. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,511 (citing Elisa Perez-Vera, Actes et documents
de la Quatorzieme Session, 3 CHILD ABDUCTION (1980)). Ms. Perez-Vera was the official
reporter for the Convention; her report stands as the official commentary and history of the
Convention.
215. Id. at 10,510.
216. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6; 19 I.L.M. at 1501. A list of Central
Authorities, with addresses, is contained in A.B.A. Guide, supra note 14, at 59-67.
217. Hearings of May 25, 1983, supra note 93, at 60.
218. Id. at 50.
219. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 7(c); 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
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Authorities in order to carry out the policies of the Convention.? 0
Since applications can be sent directly to them, each Central Au-
thority is responsible for forwarding the application to the appro-
priate Central Authority depending upon the whereabouts of the
child.?' Under Article 26, each Central Authority assumes the general
administrative expenses incurred in applying the Convention .
22
8. Rights of Access
Rights of access, or visitation rights, are provided for under Article
21. Article 21 may be invoked in two distinct situations. First, a
parent who is denied visitation rights may request assistance in
securing those visitation rights from the Central Authorities. Under
the Convention, however, a court cannot order the child to leave the
country in order to effectuate visitation rights.22 Article 21 specifies:
The Central Authorities are bound by the obligations of co-operation
which are set forth in Article 7 to promote the peaceful enjoyment
of access rights and the fulfillment of any conditions to which the
exercise of those rights may be subject. The Central Authorities
shall take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the
exercise of such rights. The Central Authorities, either directly or
through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of
proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights and
securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these
rights may be subject. 4
Where a valid, enforceable custody decree provides for visitation
rights, the non-custodial parent could invoke the applicable domestic
law regarding the custody decree and request the court which is
exercising jurisdiction over the custody decision to order transfer of
the child in compliance with the visitation provision of the decree.
2
2
Article 21 also may be invoked by a custodial parent who fears
that the non-custodial parent may not return the child at the end of
a visit abroad. The custodial parent may apply to the Hague Con-
220. See Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,511-13.
221. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 9; 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
222. Id. at art. 26; 19 I.L.M. at 1503-04. See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text
for a discussion of costs.
223. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,513. The parent whose access rights have been
infringed is not entitled under the Convention to the child's "return," but may request the
Central Authority to assist in securing the exercise of his or her access rights pursuant to
Article 21. Id.
224. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 21; 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
225. Legal Analysis, supra note 157, at 10,514.
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vention as a precautionary measure to ensure the child's return after
the visit. Pursuant to Article 21, the custodial parent can request a
performance bond or other security to ensure the return of the
child.
"6
B. International Child Abduction Remedies Act
1. Introduction
a. History
Although the Hague Convention was signed by the United States
on December 23, 1981, the U.S. implementing legislation, The Inter-
national Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), was not enacted
until April 29, 1988. 227 During the intervening seven years, both
houses of Congress as well as many professional organizations delib-
erated controversial components of the legislation, including court
jurisdiction, requisite burdens of proof in judicial proceedings, and
clarification of authentication guidelines for evidentiary purposes. 228
The U.S. State Department's Child Abduction Study Group of the
Advisory Committee on Private International Law2 9 initiated a study
of appropriate procedures for implementing the Convention.2 30 Within
the Study Group, there were conflicting views as to whether imple-
menting legislation was necessary in order to have the Convention
enter into force in the United States. 23' The Study Group recom-
mended federal legislation to ensure that the Convention would take
effect in the U.S. as smoothly and promptly as possible.2 2 The Group
226. Id. at 10,513.
227. H.R. RP. No. 525, supra note 16, at 5.
228. Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 71-73. Some of the organizations involved
are the Department of State, the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Id. See also Hearings of May 25, 1983, supra note 93.
229. Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 35. The Advisory Committee on Private
International Law represents 11 national legal organizations concerned with international
unification of private law; its Study Group includes State officials, private lawyers, law
professors and association representatives, all of whom are family law experts. Id.
230. Stotter, supra note 63, at 298. See also Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at
35 (testimony of Peter H. Pfund regarding State Department support of implementing legis-
lation).
231. Stotter, supra note 63, at 299.
232. Id. See also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 548 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
Schmidt involved a child custody case heard after the United States signed the Hague
Convention, but prior to the signing of the implementing legislation. The Hague Convention
was found inapplicable because "Congress [had] not enacted implementing legislation outlining
procedures for repatriation of children. The Convention does not become effective until
Congress acts." Id. at 198.
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focused on four areas of concern specific to the United States: 1)
the need for cooperation between the federal government and the
fifty-six separate jurisdictions; 2) the involvement of both federal
and state courts; 3) the extremely mobile nature of the U.S. popu-
lation; and 4) the absence of any requirement of United States citizens
to carry identification documents.23
The Committee drafted federal legislation for comment by the
Office of Management and Budget, as well as review by the State
Department, the Department of Justice, and the Department of
Health and Human Services. 234 The International Child Abduction
Act, H.R. 2673, was approved by the Administration and introduced
in the House of Representatives by Congressmen Gilman and Lantos
in June 1987.235 After making changes suggested at subcommittee
hearings, H.R. 2673 was ultimately replaced with H.R. 3971, the bill
which ultimately was enacted as the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA).
b. Objectives
The provisions of ICARA are meant to supplement those of the
Hague Convention, but not conflict with or replace Convention
guidelines. According to one proponent of ICARA:
[t]he ... legislation essentially explains how the Convention will
operate within the context of the U.S. legal system. The legislation
translates the provisions of the Convention-which are written in
general terms to accomodate the legal systems in the many countries
that negotiated it-into terms and procedures familiar to lawyers,
judges and government officials in this country.3 6
233. Stotter, supra note 63, at 299. The State Department Study Group consulted with the
Department of Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services in drafting an
Administration-prepared bill which would provide uniform implementation of the Convention.
Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 35.
234. Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 35.
235. At the same time that Representatives Lantos and Gilman introduced H.R. 2673, an
identical bill, S. 1347, was introduced by Senators Simon, Wallop, Dixon, Cranston, Gore,
Stennis and Exon. In February 1988, H.R. 2673 was replaced by H.R. 3971 and H.R. 3972
which split up the provisions regarding the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security
Act. H.R. 3972 was subsequently merged into H.R. 3971. A slightly amended version of the
act, which clarified the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, was passed by the House on
April 25, 1988. See H.R. REP. No. 525, supra note 16, at 7; 1988 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADmN.
NEws at 388-89. See also Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 62; A.B.A. Guide, supra
note 14, at 17.
236. Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 70. (prepared statement of Patricia M.
Hoff, Co-chairman, Child Custody Committee of A.B.A. Family Law Section).
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 2
In addition to declaring that the Act implement the Hague Conven-
tiQ and that its provisions complement those of the Convention,
the Act also recognizes the international character of the Convention
and the need for its uniform international interpretation. 27 Section
2 reiterates that the legislation does not provide procedures for
resolving underlying custody disputes but instead, "for the prompt
return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained,
as well as for securing the exercise of visitation rights. '"238
c. The U.S. Central Authority
Under section 7 of ICARA, the President is charged with desig-
nating a federal agency to serve as the U.S. Central Authority. 23 9
The President established the U.S. Central Authority in the Office
of Citizens Consular Services in the State Department, Bureau of
Consular Affairs.3 ° Subject to section 9(c) of ICARA, the Central
Authority is empowered to issue regulations to carry out the Con-
vention. 41 Interim Regulations setting forth the functions of the U.S.
Central Authority have been adopted in their original form. 2 Under
the Regulations, the CA is empowered to further the goals of the
Convention by maintaining communication with various U.S. agen-
cies and with Central Authorites in other member countries. Gener-
ally, the CA shall:
cooperate with the Central Authorities of other countries party to
the Convention and promote cooperation by appropriate U.S. state
237. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 2(b)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (1988).
238. Id. at § 2.
239. Id. at § 7(a); 42 U.S.C. § 11606 (1988).
240. Exec. Order No. 12,648, 3 C.F.R. 579 (1988), reprinted in 24 Wmmy Con'. Pms.
Doc. 1038 (Aug. 11, 1988), designates the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs as
the United States Central Authority. See A.B.A. Guide, supra note 14, at 18. See also
International Child Abduction, 22 C.F.R. § 94 (1989) [hereinafter State Department Regula-
tions].
The State Department is particularly suited to house the Central Authority because the State
Department already had provided assistance to parents faced with an international child
abduction prior to the United States' ratification of the Hague Convention. Under its previous
role, the State Department was limited to the following actions: 1) assisting in locating the
child either directly or in consultation with foreign authorities; 2) monitoring the welfare of
the child and advising the host country of any evidence of child abuse; 3) providing lists of
foreign law firms; 4) providing general information regarding the foreign country's domestic
laws and procedures; and 5) under certain situations, imposing passport restrictions. The State
Department could not provide detailed legal advice, cause its officers to take physical custody
of the child, force the child's return, or intercede in custody proceedings in the foreign court.
Hearings of May 25, 1983, supra note 93, at 33-34 (testimony of James G. Hergen, Assistant
Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
241. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 9(c); 42 U.S.C. § 11608 (1988).
242. State Department Regulations, supra note 240, at § 94.
632
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authorities to secure the prompt location and return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State, to
ensure that rights of custody and access under the laws of one
Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting
States, and to achieve the other objects of the Convention.243
The Regulations also provide specific duties the CA must perform
depending upon whether the child was abducted to the United States2
or from the United StatesY2
5
Under section 9 of ICARA, the Central Authority is required to
exchange information regarding the location of the child with other
federal or state agencies or departments in accordance with applicable
federal or state privacy laws.Y Likewise, the federal or state govern-
ment agencies are mandated to provide such information. Shared
information is limited to that which would help locate the particular
child, but could not adversely affect any federal or state law enforce-
ment or national security interests. The Central Authority is also
authorized to obtain information from the Parent Locator Service2 47
on behalf of any applicant to the Central AuthorityY28 As specified
in the legislative history to ICARA:
The provision would parallel the authority to provide Parent Locator
Services in domestic parental kidnapping cases. Only information
as to the most recent address and place of employment of the
absent parent or child would be provided .... The Parent Locator
Service would be authorized to provide information only with respect
to the missing parent and child. This information only could be
243. Id. at § 94.3.
244. Id. at § 94.6
245. Id. at § 94.7.
246. See H.R. RaP. No. 525, supra note 16, at app.; 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 401. (Letter from Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on ways and Means, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives). The importance of adherence to the Privacy Act was
pointed out by Rep. Rostenkowski in the letter as follows:
Sharing information about the possible whereabouts of kidnapped children is im-
portant but in doing so we must be careful not to violate the privacy of other
citizens. Limiting the information that can be released to the most recent address
and place of employment of the absent parent and child, as section 463 of the Social
Security Act provides, and assuring that the basic provisions of the Privacy Act also
apply will protect against the inappropriate release of information.
Id.
247. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 7(d); 42 U.S.C. § 11606 (1988). See supra note 109 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal Parent Locator Service and the Fugitive
Felon Act.
248. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 11; 42 U.S.C. § 11609 (1988).
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transmitted to a Federal, State or foreign authority or an applicant,
petitioner or respondent under the terms of the Convention. 249
The Parent Locator Service will not charge fees for locating the
abductor parent pursuant to ICARA.250 In the event the Central
Authority is unable to secure the information it seeks from the Parent
Locator Service, it may then request the information from other
departments or agencies. 251
2. Filing an Application Through ICARA
In order to start Convention proceedings for the return of a child
abducted to the United States, the applicant22 must file a petition
with the U.S. Central Authority or the Central Authority of any
other Convention member.2Y3 In the United States, the application
must be submitted in English.254 Notice to the respondent must be
served "in accordance with the applicable law governing notice in
interstate child custody proceedings." '255 If the Central Authority is
unable to persuade the respondent to return the child voluntarily,
the Central Authority will provide the applicant with information




a. The Role of the Judiciary
State courts and U.S. district courts share concurrent original
jurisdiction for actions under the Hague Convention .2 7 The decision
249. H. R. REP. No. 525, supra note 16, at 10; 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMn. NEws
at 391.
250. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 11; 42 U.S.C. § 11609 (1988).
251. Id. at § 9(d); 42 U.S.C. § 11608 (1988).
252. Id. at § 3; 42 U.S.C. § 11602 (1988). "Applicant" is any person who files an
application with any Central Authority for return of a child allegedly wrongfully removed or
retained, or for the effective exercise of rights of access under the Convention. Id.
253. Id. at § 4; 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988).
254. State Department Regulations, supra note 240, at § 94.5.
255. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 4(c); 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988). See also H.R. REP. No.
525, supra note 16, at 11; 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEWS at 393. In the event the
child is located in one United States jurisdiction, where the applicant is filing the petition,
and the respondent is located in another United States jurisdiction, the notice requirements of
the jurisdiction in which the petition was filed will govern. Id.
256. State Department Regulations, supra note 240, at § 94.6.
257. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 4(a); 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988).
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to provide concurrent jurisdiction was strenuously debated in House
hearings,7 8 with the federal administration, represented by the U.S.
Department of Justice, opposing concurrent jurisdiction. 2 9 The core
of the argument disfavoring concurrent jurisdiction was that child
abductions fall within the domain of family law, which is traditionally
a state court matter. 260 Testifying on behalf of the American Bar
Association, and in favor of concurrent jurisdiction, Patricia M.
Hoff2 1 reasoned that ICARA does not require resolution of the
underlying custody case, and that many federal courts have been
willing to hear "actions for damages that arise in the context of
interstate child custody disputes. Federal judges have successfully
adjudicated the tort claims stemming from parental kidnapping with-
out becoming enmeshed in the merits of the underlying custody
dispute. ' ' 262 The benefit of concurrent jurisdiction cannot be under-
estimated. The applicant who fears home state favoritism of a state
court will be able to bring the suit in a federal court. 263 Interestingly,
the first reported case of an action under ICARA, In the Matter of
Sarah Isa Mohsen, a minor, Isa Yousif Mohsen, v. Leann Fleetwood
Mohsen,264 was brought in federal court. In Mohsen, the father, a
citizen of the country of Bahrain, attempted to regain actual custody
of the couple's daughter pursuant to ICARA. The U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming dismissed the petition on the
258. See International Child Abduction Act: Hearings on H.R. 2673 and H.R. 3971 Before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988) [hereinafter ICAA Hearings] (statements for
and against concurrent jurisdiction).
259. Id. at 28-54.
260. Id. at 44. Mr. Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy,
Department of Justice, testified that concurrent jurisdiction would "enmesh [the Federal courts]
in the types of domestic relations matters that Federal courts have never handled." Id.
261. Id. at 68. Ms. Hoff testified in her capacity as Co-chairman, Child Custody Committee
of the Family Law Section, American Bar Association and as a member of the Family Law
Section's ad hoc committee on the ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention.
Id.
262. Id. at 65.
263. See ICAA Hearings, supra note 258, at 66. Comparing domestic child abductions to
international child abductions, Ms. Hoff explained:
[t]he benefit of and the need for Federal court jurisdiction in addition to State court
jurisdiction, then, may be even more pronounced in an international abduction case
where the party seeking return is truly a foreigner .... The choice of court will be
at the election of the parent abroad who has been dispossessed of the child's custody
unilaterally by the person alleged to have taken the child wrongfully or retained the
child wrongfully in this country. It will give that person the opportunity to elect the
forum that could most expeditiously hear the claim, and affords to the person
abroad as many avenues of redress as are available.
Id.
264. 715 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Wyo. 1989).
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grounds that since Bahrain is not a party to the Convention, Mr.
Mohsen has no rights under ICARA.
Courts are bound to accord full faith and credit to judgments and
court orders of sister-state courts regarding return actions pursuant
to the Convention.265 Courts are empowered to take action under
either Federal or state law in order to protect the child's well-being
or to prevent further removal or concealment prior to the completion
of the judicial proceedings.2 66 A court may not order the child
removed from the person who is exercising actual control of the
child without satisfying applicable state law requirements.
267
b. Evidence and Burdens of Proof
Applications, supporting documents, and other information sub-
mitted to the U.S. Central Authority or to U.S. courts does not need
to be authenticated. 268 ICARA requires the petitioner to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence 2 9 that the child has been taken wrong-
fully. In earlier drafts of the implementing legislation, a respondent
who opposed the child's return was required to show by clear and
convincing evidence 270 that one or more of the exceptions to returning
265. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 4(g); 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988). A court decision to return
a child or to deny the return of a child shall be given full faith and credit throughout the
United States jurisdictions. However, the possibility of an appeal from a return order or an
order denying return is not prohibited. Id.
266. Id. at § 5; 42 U.S.C. § 11604 (1988).
267. Id.
268. Id. at § 6; 42 U.S.C. § 11605 (1988).
269. A "preponderance of evidence" is defined as "[e]vidence which is of greater weight
or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is evidence
which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not." BLAcK's
LAW DiCTIONNAY 1064 (5th ed. 1979).
270. Id. at 227. "Clear and convincing proof" is defined as "[g]enerally,... proof beyond
a reasonable, i.e., well-founded doubt." Id. See also Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 413 A.2d
170 (1980) (citing 30 Am. JuR. 2D Evidence § 1967):
The requirement of "clear and convincing" or "satisfactory" evidence does not call
for "unanswerable" or "conclusive" evidence. The quality of proof, to be clear and
convincing, has also been said to be somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil
cases and the requirement of criminal procedure that is, it must be more than a
mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt. It has also been said that
the term "clear and convincing" evidence means that the witnesses to a fact must
be found to be credible, and the the facts to which they have testified are distinctly
remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due order, so as to
enable the trier of the facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue. Whether evidence is clear and convincing requires
weighing, comparing, testing, and judging its worth when considered in connection
with all the facts and circumstances in evidence.
Id. at 178.
1989 / International Child Abduction
the child were met.271 However under the final version of ICARA,
only the exceptions for "grave risk of harm"2 72 and "fundamental
principles of the requested State" 273 must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. 274 All other exceptions-the child is settled in a
new home275; the petitioning parent was not exercising actual custody
at the time of the taking;276 and the child objects to being returned277-
need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence.278 Decreasing
the burden of proof enables the respondent to prevent more easily
the child's return to her habitual residence. The decrease reflects a
step back from the U.S. position to disfavor the abducting parent,
and may warrant suspicion regarding the U.S. commitment to rec-
ognizing the "international character of the Convention." 279
c. Costs
Section 8 of ICARA governs the allocation of costs and fees
associated with an action for the return of an abducted child. ICARA
requires the U.S. Central Authority to bear administrative costs for
271. See H.R. REP. No. 525, supra note 16, at 391. See also H.R. 3971, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988). This earlier version of the bill, debated February 18, 1988, differs from the final
version regarding the burdens of proof required to prove an exception to returning the child.
This earlier version required all exceptions to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The
provision reads, "In the case of an action for the return of a child, a respondent who opposes
the return of the child has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that
one of the exceptions set forth in article 12, 13, or 20 of the Convention applies." Id. at §
3(d).
See also Hearings of Feb. 3, 1988, supra note 3, at 38. On behalf of the State Department,
Peter Pfund submitted a prepared statement in support of the "clear and convincing" standard:
The respondent ... must ... demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
one of the exceptions provided by the Convention applies, i.e., the respondent must
meet a higher burden of proof in order to provide the legal basis for a finding that
the return obligation of the Convention does not apply and that the return of the
child may be refused. This provision seeks to help the left-behind parent to overcome
what is often a home-court advantage of the other parent in the country of that
parent's origin. It is intended to ensure that the exceptions to the Convention's
return obligation are sufficiently hard to demonstrate so that their. interpretation and
applications does not become so broad as to provide a precedent in the United States
that could undermine the purpose of the Convention and could have the effect
abroad of providing a basis for refusal to return children to the United States.
Id.
272. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 13(b); 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
273. Id. at art. 20; 19 I.L.M. at 1503.
274. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 4(e)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988).
275. Hague Convention, supra note 7, at art. 12; 19 I,L.M. at 1502.
276. Id. at art. 13(a); 19 I.L.M. at 1502.
277. Id. at art. 13(b); 19 I.L.M. at 1502-03.
278. ICARA, supra note 6, at § 4(s)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (1988).
279. Id. at § 2(b)(3)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (1988).
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processing an application. 20 The applicant is responsible for legal
fees, court costs and travel expenses unless governmental or private
programs assist in covering the expenses.281 However, if the respon-
dent refuses to return the child voluntarily, and the action proceeds
to court, the court ordering the return of the child is mandated to
charge the respondent for all costs in securing the child's return
unless the respondent "establishes that such order would be clearly
inappropriate.
' '1 2
ICARA is designed to honor the international philosophy of the
Hague Convention without violating U.S. constitutional standards of
due process. Both state and federal courts are available for the
foreign applicant, and the courts are obligated to charge the respon-
dent for costs which otherwise would have been assumed by the
applicant. The effectiveness of ICARA will depend largely on how
the courts apply the exceptions to the factual basis of a given case.
Although the burdens of proof have been lowered from clear and
convincing to preponderance of the evidence for three of the excep-
tions-that the applicant was not actually exercising custody at the
time of the removal, that the child objects to the return, or that the
child has become settled in the new environment-the courts should
not be too willing to allow widespread use of the exceptions. Other-
wise, potential abductors will be encouraged either to conceal the
child's whereabouts in order to meet the one-year deadline and assert
that the child has become settled, or induce the child into objecting
to the return.
V. CONCLUSION
In comparison to previous attempts to deter child abductions by
requiring recognition and enforcement of custody decisions, the Ha-
gue Convention and ICARA are revolutionary. In the United States,
domestic parental child abductions have been encouraged by short-
comings within the legal system. Since custody decrees are not final
orders, prior custody decisions were often relitigated or modified. A
parent could not assume that a custody decree would protect her
parental rights; the noncustodial parent could abduct the child and
obtain a new, conflicting custody decree in another jurisdiction.
Children were sometimes abducted repeatedly, by one parent and
280. Id. at § 8(A); 42 U.S.C. § 11607 (1988).
281. Id. at § 8(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 11607 (1988).
282. Id. at § 8(b)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 11607 (1988).
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then the other. Subsequent conflicting custody decrees were legally
ineffective and pragmatically useless. This environment of legal un-
certainty led to legislation requiring the recognition and enforcement
of sister-state custody decisions.
The problems of forum-shopping and home state favoritism also
occur worldwide, with more significant ramifications. As the number
of international marriages has increased, so has the occurrence of
international parental child abductions. Sheer distance, language bar-
riers, and differences in cultural, legal, and economic systems inten-
sify the trauma felt by the aggrieved parent as well as by the child.
These factors also foster distrust between the populace of each
country and reinforce governmental notions of paternalism, so that
home-country favoritism is promoted. Recognition and enforcement
of custody decrees are undermined in the sense that the countries
involved in the kidnapping dispute oftentimes are the home countries
of the respective parents; each country asserts nationalistic claims to
the child, regardless of whether a custody decree has been issued.
The Hague Convention does not require enforcement of prior
custody decrees; nor does it concern itself with the underlying merits
of the custody dispute. Instead, it seeks to expeditiously restore the
living situation which immediately preceded the wrongful taking. By
requiring the immediate return of abducted children to their pre-
abduction homes, the Hague Convention members have extended
notions of parens patriae internationally. Parens patraie, the notion
of the state as sovereign and as guardian of the child, is not
foresaken, but instead, shared and enlarged among the signatories to
the Convention. The requirement of returning the child regardless of
the existence of a custody order requires a commitment to the
integrity of judicial systems throughout the membership of the Con-
vention.
If the Convention and ICARA have a down-side, it lies in the
breadth of the exceptions. Courts which too easily allow the abductor
to keep the child by utilizing one or more of the exceptions not only
undermine the goals of the Convention, but also circumvent the
interests of the child to the advantage of the abductor. On the other
hand, although potential for abuse exists, the exceptions are necessary
in order for member countries to balance their notions of sovereignty
with those of international cooperation. The courts cannot escape
balancing the best interests of the child against the needs and wishes
of her parents and the goals of the Convention. Despite the fact that
the courts are not to consider the underlying merits in reaching their
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decisions, they may be required to examine some of the same
determinative facts which are relevant to the custody dispute.
Ironically, although the Convention and ICARA do not consider
the underlying merits of the custody dispute, their success ultimately
may depend on the manner in which such disputes are resolved. An
assumption must be made that the underlying dispute will be resolved
according to proper legal procedures in an unbiased manner, or the
Convention would be irrational. That is, countries would be unwilling
to return a child to her pre-abduction home if they believed the
courts there would act unjustly. The Convention must also assume
that nationalism will not be a factor in the determination of the
underlying custody dispute. The Hague Convention has committed
itself to an honor system under which the child will be returned to
her home country where the courts are entrusted to reach a balanced,
just resolution of the underlying custody dispute. If the assumptions
prove to be incorrect and home country courts render custody decrees
improperly, disputing parents and the judicial entities considering
cases under the Convention undoubtedly will utilize whatever means
available to circumvent the confines of the Convention.
The Hague Convention and ICARA, however, should positively
influence the way in which courts will resolve the underlying custody
disputes. First, by promptly returning children to their pre-abduction
homes, the courts will deter future acts of parental child abductions,
as incentives for the wrongful takings will have been eliminated.
Second, by allowing the courts in the child's domiciliary country to
determine the legal alternatives for resolving the underlying custody
dispute, the Convention affirms the integrity of that country's judicial
system. Without coercion, this Convention-wide affirmation encour-
ages just, unbiased resolutions of the underlying custody disputes.
Dana R. Rivers
